

PORTRAYING “AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE” BY
 THE METHOD OF
 ANALOGY: TOWARD CREATIVE USES OF
 THE ANALOGY OF
 ATTRIBUTION *DUORUM AD TERTIUM* FOR
 COMPARA—
 TIVE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Part III

Tokiyuki Nobuhara

B. *Charles Hartshorne: The Mind–Body Analogy*

In the preceding sub-section I considered the last chapter, Pt. V, Ch. II, of Whitehead’s *Process and Reality* from my own perspective of analogy. But, as I said earlier, there is another way of studying the chapter; that is to understand it in the light of the whole development of his cosmology in the preceding chapters of the book and in other important works written by him prior to the book. Although I occasionally referred, in my analogical consideration of the chapter, to some important passages as found there in, it is the task of the present sub-section to understand it in the light of Whitehead’s cosmology developed in the works prior to it.

If my understanding is correct, one of the most important issues in these works, including *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (1919), *The Concept of Nature* (1920), *The Principle of Relativity* (1922), *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effects* (1927), and the preceding chapters of *Process and Reality*, is the issue of “significance” which climaxes in the notion of “symbolic reference.”^{68a} According to Whitehead,

The human mind is functioning symbolically when some components of its experience elicit consciousness, beliefs,

emotions, and usages, respecting other components of its experience. The former set of components are the ‘symbols,’ and the latter set constitute the ‘meaning’ of the symbols. The organic functioning whereby there is transition from the symbol to meaning will be called ‘symbolic reference.’⁶⁹

Whitehead’s use of “symbol” here reminds me of Aquinas’ notion of the *modus significandi* (mode of signification); and his use of “meaning,” of the *perfectio significata* (perfection signified). However, it should be remembered that Whitehead’s major focus is now put upon the problem of perception, not upon the analogical transferability of human language to the realm of the Divine, as in Aquinas. Yet, it is clear that he is concerned with some function of transference.

For instance, Whitehead speaks of the problem of transference in reference to “symbolically conditioned action” as follows: “Symbolically conditioned action is action which is thus conditioned by the analysis of the perceptive mode of causal efficacy effected by symbolic transference from the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy” (S, 80). That is to say, one refers back to the perceptive mode of causal efficacy analytically or intellectually only because one is at the same time symbolically encouraged to do so by the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy.

What I think is peculiar in this case is the fact that the function of transference is taking place in the manner of retrieval, although, as Whitehead affirms, on the other hand, it is inherent in the process of the universe that “the causal efficacy *from* the past is at least one factor giving our presentational immediacy *in* the present” and that “The *how* of our present experience must conform to the *what* of the past in us” (S, 58). This paradoxical state of affairs (which comes to the fore in terms of the symbolical transference between the two perceptive modes) is strongly reminiscent of our threefold articulation of the problem of theological analogy in the preceding sub-section in terms of our ultimate metaphysical visions of reality as A [1], B, and A [2].

As I said there, vision of reality A [2] is attitudinal, in the sense that it re-enacts in creaturely-human terms what was already there in vision of reality A [1] ontologically. In this connection, we need to notice that the problem of perception has a significant metaphysical repercussion in our construction of the visions of reality in some way or another.

*Then, here arises a question: How or under what condition is “symbolic reference” in human perception correspondent to the task of theological analogy?*⁷⁰ To answer this question properly, it is important to note with Whitehead that “...symbolic reference must be explained antecedently to conceptual analysis, although there is a strong interplay between the two whereby they promote each other” (S, 19). The problem is this: symbolical reference must be explained *antecedently* to conceptual analysis—and yet this from the viewpoint of conceptual analysis or reflection: that is, *after* symbolical reference has occurred. How is this problem to be solved? In my opinion, Hartshorne wants to solve it by his doctrine of the mind-body analogy based upon the processive, temporal modality of existence he espouses with Whitehead. Then, let me scrutinize his analogical argument to know whether it is convincing or not, and if so, how.

1. *Hartshorne and Langer* Hartshorne’s enthusiasm for the theological analogy in correspondence with Whitehead’s doctrine of “symbolic reference” can be illustrated by comparison with Susanne Langer’s interest in non-discursive symbolism based upon the same doctrine. To refer to Whitehead’s definition of it again, symbolic reference is “the elucidation of percepta in the mode of causal efficacy by the fluctuating intervention of percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy” (PR, 178). Langer is interested in the mode of presentational immediacy because it provides her a key to an “unexplored possibility of genuine semantic beyond the limits of discursive language.”⁷¹

However, in her pursuit of symbolic semantics, Langer has lost sight, on the other hand, of the importance of metaphysics.

This was probably because she might have given full assent to what Hartshorne regards as Wittgenstein's criticism of metaphysics for "giving pseudo-answers to pseudo-questions, on the ground that in metaphysics we are attributing to the world what really belongs to our logical projection."⁷² Of course, Langer does not relegate the study of the logical "beyond" (which Wittgenstein calls the "unspeakable," both Russell and Carnap regard as the sphere of subjective experience, emotion, feeling, and wish) to psychology, as do Wittgenstein and his followers (PNK, 86). Yet, she nonetheless declares that "in this physical, space-time world of our experience there are things which do not fit the grammatical scheme of expression," including, presumably, metaphysics. (PNK, 88) For Hartshorne, on the contrary, linguistic modality is derivative from metaphysical modality as a temporal process (CSPM, 133). And the temporal process involves perception. If so, the metaphysical problem of analogy can also be seen as perceptively well-grounded.

2. *Hartshorne and Emmet* Hartshorne's orientation of theological analogy is significantly different from Dorothy Emmet's, another Whiteheadian metaphysician who is also interested in the combination of "symbolic reference" and analogy. Hartshorne includes in his idea of analogy literal theism. By contrast, Emmet conceives of analogy in terms of "some important character or thread of co-ordination" found in the whole manifold of experience.⁷³ That is to say, she does not pin down the problem of analogy in a clear-cut theistic manner like Hartshorne does.

One of the reasons for this might be the fact that Emmet disregards Whitehead's notion of "causal efficacy," whereas Hartshorne prizes it. Emmet replaces Whitehead's causal efficacy with what she calls the "adverbial" mode of perception—"a responsive state of the organism in rapport with, or receiving shocks from its environment" (NMT, 61). She also replaces Whitehead's presentational immediacy with her own notion of the "accusative" mode of perception, which is "a differentiation

of contents of awareness" (NMT, 42). This is precisely because she disagrees with Whitehead's epistemology, the method of extending the categories drawn from organic (i.e., pre-conscious) analogies upwards and downwards, that is, to the worlds of conscious thought and of the inorganic. As a result, for her, "knowledge is only possible where there is some actual situation of relatedness together with conscious awareness of relationship" (NMT, 66).

Thus, Emmet's epistemology is subjectivistic, in the sense that she presupposes some function of consciousness, as the accusative mode of perception, between the adverbial mode, as the internalized form of sense objects, and Whitehead's presentational immediacy, as the projection of the internalized sense objects on to a region of the contemporary world. The reason why she needs consciousness here in opposition to Whitehead's (and Heidegger's) "vague" description of the basic stage of experience (as, for instance, "prehension" or "care") is, in my view, that she fails to see the fact that for Whitehead causal efficacy is *already* incarnate in the experience here-now (specifically under its primary, dative phase) insofar as it is found to be intersecting presentational immediacy. That is to say, she does not recognize the *direct* (in the sense of pre-conscious) intersection of Whitehead's two modes of perception in the experience—the intersection which gives rise to symbolism.

3. *Hartshorne's Method of Analogy* The intent of the above remarks is to point out: *Hartshorne's method of analogy consists in the fact that he takes into serious consideration both metaphysics (involving literal theism) and causal efficacy in his combination of symbolic reference and the task of theological analogy.* In fact, literal theism and causal efficacy (in the sense of causal unification or bond) are conterminous: together they constitute the univocal element in his method of analogy. This is because for him the modality of signification is essentially temporal, then time, hence modality, is not an intra-linguistic phenomenon. And

because God-now is for him the all-inclusive reality, any assertions whatever can, without loss, be translated into an assertion about God (CSPM, 149).

Significantly enough, this is the same truth as we designated earlier as \overrightarrow{WG} . In my reality-picture (see Fig. II), \overrightarrow{WG} is contingent upon \overrightarrow{CW} (Concrescence) and intersects \overrightarrow{CG} (Primordial Exemplification). That is to say, $\overrightarrow{CW} + \overrightarrow{WG} = \overrightarrow{CG}$. In this equation, (1) \overrightarrow{CW} signifies whatever happens in the World by virtue of the ultimate metaphysical reality/principle of Creativity; (2) \overrightarrow{WG} signifies God as God absorbs into the bosom of the deity all the Worldly processes; and (3) \overrightarrow{CG} signifies the Primordial Nature of God, *qua* the "acquirement of Creativity of a primordial character" (PR, 344), as it integrates into itself the Consequent Nature of God in order for the entire God to "be fundamentally with us creatures" under the primary, dative phase of the nascent creation—the phase which Whitehead calls "natural potentiality" (S, 36, 50) or "the stubborn fact" (S, 37). Our present formula, in my view, very much fits in with Hartshorne's method of analogy, the mind-body analogy referring to the all-embracing love of God (which Hartshorne considers under the heading of "panentheism"), if point 3 above is acceptable at all to him.⁷⁴

When it comes to the analogical predication of God, we are dealing with linguistic modality, which is derivative from temporal or ontological modality. On this level, Hartshorne distinguishes the category of analogical signification from two other categories, symbolism and literalism. For him, symbolical terms are usable only in reference to quite specific sorts of things, such as "shepherd," "ruler," and "potter." And literal terms like "relative" and "absolute" make sense only in metaphysics. But analogical terms like "know" or "love" belong to the problematic class of theological concepts (CSPM, 155). That is to say, for him the analogical category of signification, which is neither unambiguously literal nor unambiguously non-literal, is a bridge area between metaphysics and theology as the science of revelation

(e.g., Luther's metaphorical analogy we studied in Section II).

Now Hartshorne begins his discussion of the mind-body analogy by an appreciation of the Thomistic idea of *modus significandi* with these words:

The relation of God to the world must necessarily be conceived, if at all, by analogy with relations given in human experience. To reject such analogies completely would be to adopt a wholly "negative" or empty theology, besides contradicting the basic religious doctrine that man is the image of God. Accordingly, a principal task of any theology is to examine the relations in which things stand in our experience in order to discover the direction in which the indeed superior, but not in every sense incomparable, relations of God are to be sought. ⁷⁵

Hartshorne finds the most reliable sense of such analogies in the relations between human beings and creatures inferior to them, in view of the fact that what is prerequisite to the theological analogy is the notion of "whole." "Our relation to the sub-human," he says, "to bear much analogy to the relation of God to the world, must be a relation to a whole of things all of which are radically inferior to us, and in which whole we may be said to be something like omnipresent or immanent" (MVG, 175). For him one and only such whole is the human body.

It may be noted, however, that Hartshorne regards the seeming solidarity of the body as an exaggeration of sense perception because perception is on the macroscopic scale, while the real individuals in the body are microscopic (MVG, 176). If we infer, from the fact that no organism contains individual parts which as such are clearly "perceptible," that organisms probably or certainly contain no individual parts, we would be doomed to make a pure philosophic error. For the premise of the inference, as Hartshorne critically assumes, is that what

does not appear distinctively to the human senses probably or certainly does not exist (MVG, 177). Radically different from Emmet's subjectivism mentioned earlier, Hartshorne holds that there is something in the body which is hidden from us--the position in line with what Whitehead calls "the closure of nature to mind."⁷⁶ This something involves a multiplicity of invisible parts, that is, of parts which cannot nevertheless be thought lacking in real individuality.

Thus, if the body is really a "world" of individuals, then a mind, if the body is one having a mind (or one capable of thinking and feeling), is to that body something like an indwelling God (MVG, 177). And because the immediate object of effective human control or volition is a change in the human body, the power-relation, *qua* the mind-body relation, can be used as the basis for the theological analogy (MVG, 179). It is from this perspective that Hartshorne poses three statements, the former one referring to the *analogatum* (i.e., humanity) and the latter ones to analogans (i.e., God), as follows:

[1] ...the body as a whole as a dynamic individual unit (not a collection) or--it is the same thing--as a mind, wills: the parts of the body (which may be minds, but not *that* mind) respond. (MVG, 182).

[2] ...if God be complete there must be *something* in him which is simple and always the same, and this is fully provided for by the A [i.e., Absolute] factor in the AR [i.e., Absolute and Relative] doctrine. (MVG, 182)

[3] ...God has no separate sense organs or muscles because all parts of the world body directly perform function for him. In this sense the world is God's body. (MVG, 185)

To sum up, what Hartshorne is proposing in terms of his

doctrine of the mind-body analogy, in my own view, is something like the following formula:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{human mind} & & \text{Divine Mind as A} \\ \hline & : & \\ \text{human body} & & \text{The World as Divine Body or R.} \end{array}$$

In maintaining the bond in the proportionality the fourth term is given to us prior to the analogy in the sense of linguistic modality (see the above statement 3 and our afore-mentioned $\overrightarrow{\text{WG}}$). However, the fourth term is correlated with the third term in the entire reality of God (see the above statement 2 and our afore-mentioned $\overrightarrow{\text{CG}}$). Otherwise, there cannot exist the organic proportionality of the Divine relation (consisting in the third and fourth terms) to the human relation (consisting in the first and second terms, as mentioned in the above statement 1).

Further, with regard to the actual relation between the second and third terms, namely, "human body" and "Divine Mind as A," it is crucial, to my mind, that we conceive of the latter (God) as already being with the former (creature) under the primary, dative phase of the nascent self-creation by us. It is precisely at this juncture that I approve (although in a way transformatively) of Whitehead's maxim to the effect that in the primordial aspect of the deity God is "not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation" (PR, 343).^{76a} However, Hartshorne's analogical argument doesn't fully articulate this point, although it is convincingly based upon the fourth term (The World as Divine Body or R) in terms of his own unique reinterpretation of Whitehead's notion of the Consequent Nature of God.

My concern here, accordingly, is with articulating the problem of how God is fundamentally "with us"—under the primary, dative phase of the nascent creation—even *before* the A element of the deity (i.e., Divine Mind) impinges upon us evocatively. By contrast, Harthorne's literalism (which constitutes the essential part of his analogical argument) is an attempt at knowing how God is "together with us creatures" after the

worldly process of concrescence has come to an end. For this reason it is inseparably combined with the perspective of God's everlasting memory.

It is my contention, then, that in accounting for the entire scope of temporal modality both perspectives can assist and supplement each other into mutual enrichment. For after the completion of the present concrescence there always arises the period of understanding-*plus*-preparation before the next concrescence gets started--indeed, repeatedly anew in the creative advance of the universe. And this is the only reason why the analytical or intellectual retrieval of meaning (*qua* causal efficacy) by way of "symbolic reference," mentioned earlier, is possible even after symbols are given before our eyes presentationally immediately. It must also be in this sense that Paul Ricoeur is right metaphysically, as well as theologically, when he claims in *The Symbolism of Evil* that "Symbols give rise to thought."^{76b}

Section IV: Concluding Remarks

In any field of science it is of utmost importance what kind of question one wants to answer. In my case, I have found in the Thomistic analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* one of the most crucial questions in the history of systematic theology or philosophy of religion. That is the question: Why or on what basis does Thomas Aquinas discard this type of analogy? Obviously, as I articulated in Section I, one of the reasons is that he lacks the knowledges of the dipolar nature of God and of the distinction between God and the metaphysical ultimate, Being. And this shows an essential characteristic of traditional type natural theology.

In the course of the development of theology in the Christian West, however, this characteristic has been broken through at least in two cases: Luther's vision of the deity as dual and Whitehead's differentiation of the ultimate metaphysical principle of creativity from God. As elucidated in Sections II

and III, each case, though unwittingly, provides an ontological guarantee of the analogy in question. I find in Luther's doctrine of justification and prayer a theistic or Christological vindication of the analogy in terms of justice-language and in Whitehead's consideration of God and the world a metaphysical vindication of it in terms of creativity-language.

Hence, there arise two kinds of "authentic existence": one is authentic by being "righteous by faith alone" and the other by being "creative." (If I can add here the case of Buddhist Emptiness in the sense of Emptiness emptying itself, thereby being "selflessly creative," the authenticity of creativity-language in reference to human existence is guaranteed more fully.) At any rate, these two types of existence are both authentic in their own unique ways. They are incommensurable; and yet they are authentic in a complementary fashion because they require each other for the sake of the wholeness of humanity in a global age, such as ours. One can argue, for instance, that if we were "righteous" without being "creative," we would be doomed to be narrow-minded and powerless. Conversely, if we were "creative" only without being concerned to be "righteous," then we would be lacking in our actual lives a focus of our abundant energy, hence, aimless and wasteful.

From my perspective of analogy, it is within the framework of Luther's symbolical theology that Barth's *Analogia Fidei cum Analogia Relationis* and Pannenberg's doxological analogy have articulated the theological structure of Protestantism: it is dialectical but fails to deal with the Thomistic question of how God, Being, and beings are related to each other. It is within the framework of Whitehead's metaphysics that an articulate answer is given to this question, while at the same time taking seriously the dialectical view of God (see Hartshorne's dipolar theism). *Thus, it is my contention that under the aspect of a Whiteheadian vindication of the analogy there is a higher synthesis of Revealed and Natural Theologies.*⁷⁷ This synthesis contains four elements or dimensions: (1) topology; (2) the analogy of being; (3) the

initiation of aims; and (4) the fulfillment of aims. Let me explain each of them as follows:

1. *Topology or Metaphysics of Creativity: The Metaphysical Reinterpretation of the Analogy of Attribution duorum ad tertium*

On the ultimate metaphysical level, reality is that under which God and the World are both subsumed; as such, it is the *topos* where God and the World are ultimately located. As Nishida insightfully states, God and the World are one by virtue of the principle of “unity of opposites.” To use Whitehead’s phraseology, God and the World are both in the grip of Creativity. Analogically, this means that the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* is of avail in metaphysics. Thus, authentic existence in this regard is one which is “creative” on its own while at the same time correspondent to this metaphysical picture, as mentioned earlier.

It should be noted that part of this reality-picture is the theistic fact that in God the primordial nature (which is the primordial character of Creativity) and the consequent nature (which is contingent upon the concrescence of particulars in the world which happens by virtue of Creativity) are creatively unified. Contrary to the Thomistic view, in God essence and existence are not merely identical but rather form the theistic case of unity of opposites. Recall here our formulation as regards Hartshorne’s doctrine of organic analogy: $\overrightarrow{CW} + \overrightarrow{WG} = \overrightarrow{CG}$.

2. *Analogical Exemplification: Analogia Entis in the Sense of the Analogy of Proper Proportionality*

If the first truth is acknowledged, we need not object to the Thomistic analogy of proper proportionality which is based upon the analogical exemplification of Being (Lat., *esse*) in both God and particulars. For, while, topologically-ontologically, God and particulars are in the grip of Being, proportionately-ontologically, they exemplify it in themselves. Each being has,

accordingly, its own portion or right (Lat., *suum cuique*) in the universe—God maximally and particulars in their respectively limited ways. This is important in that it lays foundation for the notion of justice because justice is "to render to each person his or her due." Accordingly, authentic existence in this regard is one which is "just" in accordance with the proportionate-analogical structure of ontology.

A critical revision of the Thomist concept of being is imperative from the Whiteheadian perspective, though. Beings must be considered not in individualistic but in unificatory terms. That is, beings are the creative unifications here-now of the universe. And Being is the principle of creative unification or creativity. It follows that one's own portion or right is not an individualistic but unificatory actuality.

3. *The Initiation of Aims: The Analogy of Attribution unius ad alterum*

When it comes to the ontological-axiological dimension of the universe, the former two truths give way to the third truth: the initiation of aims in particulars by God as God is primordial in terms of the analogy of attribution *unius ad alterum*. Here we may say, with Thomists, that beings are "effects-implicating-cause." But this is true only insofar as beings respond to the ordering will of God which impinges upon their own respective modes of being, saying: "Accomplish your duties given to you proportionately-ontologically according to your portions in the universe while at the same time giving to every one other than yourselves his or her due."

As is implicit in this phraseology, the analogy at issue presupposes the working of the analogy of proper proportionality, our second truth. In this respect, I agree with James F. Anderson that the analogy of attribution is only "virtual." According to him, it is only by *virtue* of that intrinsic Analogy, that this latter Analogy (which involves the logical use of a properly univocal term after the manner of an intrinsic analogy) has a

place in metaphysical demonstration at all. Then, he goes so far as to say:

Is it not clear that this concept is therefore not analogous in the manner of a concept formally univocal which can be applied to a number of different things? Is it not clear that this concept is therefore *not* analogous by Analogy of Attribution? For it is simply not true that “being” is intrinsic to only one Analogate—the Prime—and is then transferred to the other Analogates only because they are somehow related to the Prime. To understand that in actual fact being is found in all beings is merely to recognize that everything that is, is! In other words, the over-all Analogy of Being in its actuality contains only virtually Analogy of Attribution in the sense that it has the *virtue* or power of producing an effect, namely, extrinsic denomination from One, which Analogy of Attribution alone produces formally.⁷⁸

It is important to take heed here that Luther’s notion of *deus absconditus* is intelligible only against this background. As the entitative nature of God, the *deus absconditus* orders humans to live according to the principle of retributive justice (*iustitiae talionis*). But if we lost sight of the proportionately-ontological aspect, while over-emphasizing the *unius ad alterum* aspect, of the entitative God, we would be terrified, as was Luther, by the thought that the complete fulfillment of retributive justice before God (*coram Deo*) is impossible for humanity. Yet, we would be right in part in this, as was Luther, for retributive justice contains, at least on the religious level, our trustful loyalty to God. And, from the perspective of loyalty, we need the help of the power of loyalty which evokes our loyalty to God in spite of our depravity. This power we can find, as Luther’s discovery of the new righteousness of God (*iustitia Dei nova*) testifies, in Christ. At any rate, authentic existence in

this regard is one which is "loyal or dutiful" to the call of God.

4. *The Fulfillment of Aims: The Christological Reinterpretation of the Analogy of Attribution duorum ad tertium*

As has been shown in Section II, Luther's doctrine of justification and prayer satisfies the intent of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* religiously. That is, our prayer induces, the *deus revelatus* manifests, and the *deus absconditus* enjoys, justice. This is mainly because Luther has elucidated the paradoxical character of the Christ event: namely, although, ontologically, God is everywhere, God is nowhere other than in Christ from the viewpoint of soteriology. The core of the paradox consists in the fact that Christ has radically fulfilled the inmost requirement of retributive justice (i.e., loyalty to God) for our sake on the cross, thus bringing dramatically into existence a totally new righteousness of God: forgiveness as the justice by virtue of which God makes us righteous (*iustitia Dei qua nos iustus faciens*). This righteousness of God is in itself prayer for us (see Sec. II, B). As such, it is the best answer to the Augustinian prayer which Luther shares: *Da quod iubes* (Give me what you order).

This does not, however, mean that the new righteousness of God is the character restricted to the *deus revelatus*. Rather, it exists ontologically, too, as what Whitehead calls the consequent nature of God (i.e., Hartshorne's R) which in God is creatively unified with the primordial nature (i.e., Hartshorne's A), as I mentioned earlier. In history it expresses itself eschatologically, though.

If the forgiveness or mercy of God exists ontologically as well, then nobody—whether Christian or non-Christian—is alienated from it. Hence, everyone's due (*suum cuique*) is taken into account by God supremely benevolently. We are thus encouraged to refer back to retributive justice afresh—this time in the light of the all-embracing love of God. In this light it becomes important once again to render to everyone his or her

due in a limited, proportionate way. A reevaluation of the Thomist Analogy of Being is thus enabled against the background of a deepened vision of Reformation theology. Then, we can say: ultimately, we are “righteous” by faith alone, by the all-embracing love of God; and, penultimately, we are “just” proportionately-ontologically according to the principle of *Analogia Entis*.

I hope the fourfold portrayal of “authentic existence” I have thus far provided by a study of the problem of analogy will help us cherish the spirit of tolerance, dialogue, and mutual understanding between different types of philosophy of religion, such as Thomism, Protestant confessionalism, Whiteheadian process thought, and the Nishida school of Buddhist philosophy.

NOTES:

- 68a. See my critical review of Saburo Ichii's *Whitehead no tetsugaku* (Whitehead's Philosophy), *Process Studies*, 13/2, Summer 1983, 173-76.
69. Alfred North Whitehead, *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 7-8. (Hereinafter cited as S.)
70. It might be said that Gordon Kaufman has come across the same question when he pays attention to the fact that according to Kant's critical analysis of the nature and function of human reason the central ideas with which metaphysics works—ideas like "God," "world," and "self"—function differently in our thinking from concepts dealing with objects of direct experience, concepts like "tree" or "man." (See his *The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God* [Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981], p. 242.) However, when he proceeds along these lines to interpret theology as "a critical and constructive task, performed by humans for the sake of certain human needs and purposes" (*ibid.*, p. 264), it seems that Kaufman fails to take into account the fundamental, ontological, and pre-linguistic efficacy of the divine influence upon human (and also non-human) experience which is real but non-sensory. In this respect, a Whiteheadian approach to the problem of theological analogy or imagination might be different from Kaufman's, as is manifest in Hartshorne's case below.
71. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 86. (Hereinafter cited as PNK.)
72. Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis & Philosophic Method* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1970), p. 133. (Hereinafter cited as CSPM.)
73. Dorothy M. Emmet, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* (London: Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 204; cf. p. 215. (Hereinafter cited as NMT.)
74. Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. vii, xv, 88f.
75. Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God* (Hamden, CONN: Archon, 1964), p. 174. (Hereinafter cited as MVG.)
76. Victor Lowe, *Understanding Whitehead* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 208.

- 76a. Why I say I refer to Whitehead's maxim transformatively is that he conceives of the primordial nature of God merely generally in terms of "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality" (PR, 343) without reference to the exact mode in which God is "with us." By contrast, I clearly locate the co-existence of this nature of God at the point of "real potentiality"—namely, the dative phase of the novel creation. Cf. Lewis S. Ford, "Creativity in a Future Keym," in *New Essays in Metaphysics*, ed. Robert C. Neville (State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 185.
- 76b. Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 19, 347–57.
77. This statement represents my over-all vision of systematic theology. According to John Macquarrie, there are three divisions in systematic theology: (1) philosophical (or natural) theology; (2) symbolical (or revealed) theology; and (3) applied theology (see his *Principles of Christian Theology*, Revised Edition [London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966, 1977], pp. 39–40). As has been elucidated in the text, my understanding of the three divisions of systematic theology is processive and dialectical, not simply typological. As a result, the third division is synthetic and inclusive as well as applied in nature. And this means that natural theology, although it is once radically negated by the revealed theology of Protestantism, is re-vitalized on the condition that it now is guided by the revelationist-rationalist principle—the topological re-interpretation of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* as it is inclusive of both Thomism and Reformation theology, as shall be clarified in the text.

Traditional type natural theology is concerned with the knowledge of God (i.e., the existence and the benovolent nature of the Deity) by rational means alone. Because it needs the Christian revelation for the completion of the knowledge of God (specifically as "triune"), it is in essence, as William Temple critically designates, "the philosophical introduction to Religion" but not Religion itself (*Nature, Man, and God* [London: Macmillan Company], 1956, p. 10). However, a renewed fashion of natural theology deals with the same content of Religion as does revealed theology—but by the philosophical method, hence, with no claim to authority of the community of faith (see Temple, *op.cit.*, p. 7; see also John B. Cobb, Jr., *A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead* [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965], pp. 266–67).

It is within the context of the need for the re-vitalization

of Natural Theology as Applied Theology that I regard David Tracy as basically right when he says as follows: "For all those who cannot share either the easy answer of a relaxed pluralism or the hard answer of a brittle univocity, the reality of an analogical imagination becomes a live option in our day" (see his *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* [New York; Crossroad, 1981], p. 451). Then, the analogical imagination which my vision of the task of systematic theology for today cherishes can be represented by the following passage from John Ruskin's *Modern Painters*: "So, then, we have the three ranks: the man who perceives rightly, because he does not feel, and to whom the primrose is accurately the primrose, because he does not love it. Then, secondly, the man who perceives wrongly, because he feels, and to whom the primrose is anything else than a primrose: a star, or a sun, or a fairy's shield, or a forsaken maiden. And then, lastly, there is the man who perceives rightly in spite of his feelings, and to whom the primrose is for ever nothing else than itself—a little flower, apprehended in the very plain and leafy fact of it, whatever and how many soever the associations and passions may be that crowd around it" (Vol. 3, 1859, pp. 162-63). In my new paradigm of systematic theology, rationalism and symbolism can both be satisfied.

78. Anderson, *Reflection on the Analogy of Being*, p. 29; cf. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy*, pp.37-38.