

The Artistic Theology in F. M. Dostoevsky's  
*Crime and Punishment*

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I. Introduction

As a Japanese convert to Christianity, I have long been concerned with a question: How can Christians in a non-Christian country speak of God while speaking of things non-Christian? This question involves two aspects. One aspect is this: insofar as things non-Christian imply non-Christian religions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto, they are driven to investigate theologically some authentic meanings of the existence and characteristics of these religions for Christian faith. The other aspect is that insofar as things non-Christian, on the other hand, imply things secular or worldly, they are induced to consider some realizable possibilities of their confession of God in and through their secular experiences in the world. My interest in the literature of F. M. Dostoevsky is related to this latter aspect of the above question.

As is evident in the question, my concern is analogical. The spirit of theological analogy—whether it be of Thomas Aquinas' *Analogia Entis*<sup>1</sup> or of Karl Barth's *Analogia Fidei*<sup>2</sup> or of Wolfhart Pannenberg's doxological analogy<sup>3</sup> or of Charles Hartshorne's organic analogy<sup>4</sup>—is to adore God while referring to things in the world.<sup>4a</sup> How is, then, theological analogy possible when it comes to speaking of "evil things" in the world? What form does it take? I know nothing more adequate to say in reply to these questions than the following dictum by Martin Luther: "...God is justified by the confession of our sins. Even though he is righteous and truthful in himself, he is not so in us unless we confess and say: 'Against thee, thee only, have I sinned' (Ps. 51:4). Then he [God] is acknowledged

as the only righteous one. And so he is made righteous also in us.”<sup>5</sup> Thus the spirit of theological analogy is shot through with a confessional motivation through and through.<sup>6</sup>

It is Paul Ricoeur who names this type of theological analogy the symbolism of evil. The symbolism of evil is a dual movement in which one is faced with one’s own evil existentially while, on the other hand, constantly encouraged to refer to the realm beyond in the act of confession.<sup>7</sup> It is because of this double nature of the symbolism of evil that symbolic signs, unlike perfectly transparent technical signs, as Ricoeur insightfully points out, are opaque, because “the first literal, obvious meaning itself points analogically to a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in it” (SE, 15). Accordingly, if we want to grasp the true meaning of symbolic signs, we must be attentive to the confessional intentionality implicit in them.<sup>8</sup> Yet, conversely, it is only in and through the private depiction of individual evils they embody in themselves that their confessional intentionality, as commensurate with the adoration of God, is made publicly effective.

Hence, the symbolism of evil assigns to us a difficult task: that is the task of pursuing the confessional aim of theology, the adoration of God, while at the same time attending to the real and concrete description of evil which is the vocation of literature. But how can we achieve the theological and the literary vocations at once? At this juncture, it is my contention that we can find in the literature of F.M. Dostoevsky a fullfledged artistic fulfillment of this task inherent in the symbolism of evil: theology in literary form.

Thus, the intent of this essay is to propose and demonstrate that we can find in Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment* a theology—one expressed in a thoroughly artistic manner so as to show that our analogical reference to God is possible in modern times only through the confession of our existential breakdown. This theology inheres in the novel. But unless someone digs it out hermeneutically—theologically, it does not come into existence in

an effectively visible manner as a valid bridge across the boundaries of the two realms of thought, theology as a sacred science and modern literature as a secular enterprise.

My proposal is an effort to radically widen the scope of theologizing in face of secular, non-Christian modernity, so much so that we might theologize even outside the walls of the Church. This effort I might call theology "from below" in contrast to traditional theology "from above." My conviction is that a theological interpretation of literature is a theology "from below." This is imperative in a non-Christian and modernized country, such as my own, Japan, where modern literature flourishes. Japanese culture at large is alienated from formal theology. The general public is not ready for a serious intellectual consideration of Christian topics, such as "God," "justification by faith," and "original sin." But this does not mean that they are not concerned about the crux of the Christian message, the salvation of humans. They really are concerned about it and they read Christian literature produced both at home<sup>9</sup> and abroad. Especially their love for F.M. Dostoevsky is a conspicuous indication of this.<sup>10</sup> The Japanese are not intellectually oriented in their religious concern; they are an esthetic-religious people.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, it is of great value in Japan to present theological ideas in literary form.

In my opinion, the artistic theology in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* has the following three characteristics or stages:

First, it is concerned with the desiderative structure of the human being as embodied in his or her ideas. This is the theme which many critics consider under the heading of "the meaning of ideas in Dostoevsky's literature," as shall be scrutinized in Section II. My own conviction, as it shall be elucidated in Section III, is that the artistic-scientific method, by which he makes use of the ideas in the novel, e.g., of Raskolnikov's, of Luzhin's, and of Svidrigailov's, is a "phenomenology of ideas."

Second, the theology in question traces the ideatic phenomena down to their ultimate destiny of self-destruction<sup>12</sup>, as shall be shown in Section IV, 1. This is the *depth*-situation of humans which Dostoevsky himself designates "Crime and Punishment." Here Berdyaev is quite right in saying: "[T]he end of [Dostoevsky's] art surpasses experimental reality and is to express hidden reality, not in a direct way, but by means of projected shadows."<sup>13</sup>

Third, in this theology Dostoevsky artistically-scientifically investigates human nature as at once "self-transcendence" and "love" against the background of the *depth*-situation, as shall be elucidated in Section IV, 2. This is, in my view, enabled to appear in the midst of Raskolnikov's repentance and Sonia's love for him only by the power of liberation which is at work at the center of Dostoevsky's artistic creativity. Here is one of the cases in which we might rightly assume, with John B. Cobb, Jr. and André Malraux, that "as Christ disappeared from the content of Western art he became, under other names, its acknowledged inner principle."<sup>14</sup>

After considering these points, I shall make some important concluding remarks in Section V.

## II. The Meaning of Ideas in Dostoevsky's Literature

It has attracted many critics' attention that ideas are playing a unique role in the works of Dostoevsky. But when it comes to discussing *what kind of* role they are playing, they do not necessarily agree. It is a complicated task to ascertain the real meaning of ideas in Dostoevsky's literature. Most of the critics take the ideas (which are possessed by Raskolnikov, Marmeladov, Myshkin, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov, and other characters in Dostoevsky's novels) as those of the author himself. E.H. Carr, for instance, explains Raskolnikov by the experiences of his creator in the convict settlement at Omsk (as well as by "romantic influences" upon him when he was young). Carr regards the philosophy of the superman Raskolnikov acted

upon and its collapse as a direct reflection of those of the author.<sup>15</sup>

It is B.M. Engel'gardt who, in an article entitled "Dostoyevski's Ideological Novel," first came very close to grasping, by probing into Dostoevsky's poetics, the distinctive role which ideas play in his works. Engel'gardt writes:

Dostoyevski portrayed the life of an idea in the consciousness of the individual and of society, for he considered it the determining factor of an intellectual milieu. But this should not be understood to mean that he wrote purpose novels and slanted stories or that he was a tendentious artist, more of a philosopher than a poet. He wrote not purpose novels, nor philosophical novels in the taste of the eighteenth century, but novels about an idea. Just as adventure, anecdote, a psychological type, a genre painting, or a historical picture might serve as central subject for other novelists, for him an "idea" served this purpose.<sup>16</sup>

Engel'gardt has found that ideas play the central role in Dostoevsky's novels, not as the principles guiding the portrayal (as usual in most novels), nor as conclusions (as usual in a *roman à thèse*), but as the very things being portrayed.<sup>17</sup> What then does integrate into one world as embodied in a work the world of ideas as objects of description? Engel'gardt tries to solve this problem by dividing the basic themes of Dostoevsky's novels according to the three planes of the environment, the country, and the world representing separate stages of the dialectical development of the spirit and the only path toward the "unconditional affirmation of being" (DRLC, 210-11).

M.M. Bakhtin agrees with Engel'gardt in considering the role of ideas in Dostoevsky's novel as lying in the fact that they are "objects of description." With respect to the unifying principle of the author and the novel, however, it is Bakhtin's opinion that Engel'gardt lost from sight the polyphony of

Dostoevsky's novels. In his view, Engel'gardt's three-stage hypothesis did away with the polyphony. Bakhtin, on the contrary, argues that Dostoevsky's artistic vision focuses mainly upon coexistence and interaction, not upon the process of formation (DRLC, 212).<sup>18</sup>

For Bakhtin the world of Dostoevsky comprises only that which can be comprehended and combined at one time. Accordingly, Bakhtin conjectures that Dostoevsky would admit only such simultaneous phenomena as can be grasped in terms of eternity in which everything coexists. Thus "coexistence" means for him the *ens sub specie aeternitatis*. Bakhtin explains the dynamics peculiar to Dostoevsky's novels, i.e., the catastrophic swiftness of action or the "whirlwind movement," as not representing the "victory of time" but the "conquest of it"; for him swiftness is the "only way to conquer time in time."<sup>19</sup>

With respect to "interaction," it is important for Bakhtin that Dostoevsky has portrayed not the activities of ideas in one consciousness, or the interaction of ideas on the plane on which he personally suffered through conflicts in the history of his spirit, but the interaction of consciousnesses in terms of their ideas (though not ideas only). Thus Bakhtin is critical of Engel'gardt's thesis of "ideological novel." Both Bakhtin and Engel'gardt regard ideas as the very things being portrayed. But it is one thing to say that ideas are the heroes of Dostoevsky's novels, it is quite another to say that the hero is the human being. In criticizing Engel'gardt's view, Bakhtin has gained a new understanding of the role of "ideas" in Dostoevsky's novels: "The ideas in man are not the heroes of his novels; the hero is *man himself in man*, whom the idea—instead of the usual environment and circumstances of fiction—reveals and expresses" (DRLC, 214; italics mine). That is to say, ideas are the "functions"—in their mathematical sense—of what Dostoevsky terms "man himself in man." To put it in another way, ideas are the media through which one's consciousness in its innermost depth can be disclosed.<sup>20</sup>

Bakhtin gives the name of the "polyphonic novel" to such a novel of Dostoevsky's guided by the principle of the "sociology of consciousnesses."<sup>21</sup> The distinctive characteristic of this novel, asserts Bakhtin, is the presence of a multiplicity of voices, each given its full value. Each consciousness has equal rights, each its own separate world. The characters are not only objects in respect to the author but also subjects, independent voices, bearers of their own word. It is in view of this characteristic of polyphony that Bakhtin thinks it impossible to apply to Dostoevsky any of the criteria developed during the history of the European novel (DRLC, 203).<sup>22</sup>

There is one difficulty in Bakhtin's theory of the polyphonic novel, though. For him both of the key-notions, "interaction" and "coexistence," are spatial in nature. True, "interaction" is a dramatic concept of space. But is it truly correct to regard "coexistence" as also a spatial concept? According to Bakhtin coexistence can only occur *sub specie aeternitatis*; for the very purpose of attaining this stage, we need "the catastrophic swiftness of action," "the conquest of time," and "a realized eschatology." If that be the case, the level of coexistence or simultaneity involves the sense of "becoming together in the presence of God" and is deeper than that of dialogical or dramatic interaction, i.e., space. Precisely because this is so, interaction might be accelerated toward its depth. Until each character comes to this point of *depth*-interaction, he or she groans incessantly with unfulfilled time in his or her mind. Only because each character holds his or her peculiar time-experience, there is a possibility for experiencing and portraying a dialogue between different time-experiences in terms of a polyphonic novel.

It is from this point of view that we contend that Bakhtin has somewhat obscured the dimension of temporality, by over-estimating the dimension of spatiality, in Dostoevsky's novels. Indeed, the dimension and the dynamics of time are always operative in Dostoevsky's literary world. This is overlooked by

Bakhtin because of his one-sided, negative reaction to Engel'gardt. Then, what in actuality would be the dimension of temporality like?

Let me now quote Berdyaev. He is also interested in the fact that ideas play a preponderant part in Dostoevsky's novels. However, Berdyaev interprets this fact from a different point of view: "He [Dostoevsky] subjected man to a spiritual experiment, putting him into unusual situations and then taking away all external stays one after another till his whole social framework has gone" (D, 45).

The conception of "spiritual experiment" above is the very method that fosters that catastrophically swift and dramatic time-experience which is peculiar to Dostoevsky's world of literature. From this perspective, in my view, Bakhtin's understanding of ideas as the media through which "man himself in man" may be disclosed comes to light, given a new meaning. That is to say, what comes to be elucidated is Dostoevsky's anthropology, an anthropology which lies beyond the scope of his poetics and to which his poetics constitutes a scientific approach. As Berdyaev writes,

Dostoevsky was more than anything else an anthropologist, an experimentalist in human nature, who formulated a new science of man and applied to it a method of investigation hitherto unknown. His artistic science or, if it be preferred, his scientific art studied that nature in its endless conclusions and limitless extent, uncovering its lowest and most hidden layers. (D, 45)

Here we can see that the deconstructive part of Dostoevsky's theology of literature is subsumed under the category of anthropology of "uncovering humanity's lowest and most hidden layers." This is important because a theology of literature does not speak of God or Christ in a direct manner but only analogically—namely, by way of the confession of sins. However, the



confession of sins, which I assume is the recuperative part of Dostoevsky's theology of literature, presupposes the destiny of existential break-down of all humans or what Ricoeur calls the symbolism of evil, of which the above-mentioned anthropology constitutes an innermost methodology.

This methodology of Dostoevsky is inclusive, as has been elucidated, of a unique treatment of ideas in a literary world. Ideas can be portrayed as objects which are of avail publicly, and yet they are, in reality, subjects which are of significance privately insofar as they involve the time-experiences of each character. However, precisely in the midst of their subjectivity they reveal themselves as objects, namely, as objects of dialogue. That is to say, such and such a character's ideas are analyzed and challenged by his or her dialogue partner. Furthermore and finally, ideas turn out to be objects of deconstructive anthropology.

Then, there arises a question: How is this manifold attitude toward ideas made possible in Dostoevsky's literature in terms of his poetics? To put it differently: What can we call the entirety of his poetics? What is Dostoevsky's principle of portrayal or scientific spirit as such which resides in and controls his poetics as a whole? My answer to these questions is: a phenomenology of ideas. This must, of course, be verified by a reading of the text of his novels. I therefore would like to choose as such a text *Crime and Punishment* to be studied in the subsequent sections.

### III. The Symbolism of Evil As a Phenomenology of Ideas

In *Crime and Punishment* the symbolism of evil as the deconstructive part of Dostoevsky's theology of literature takes the form of a phenomenology of ideas. It deconstructs ideas phenomenologically as long as they are self-contained and uses them as the "rational symbols" of the gravest human predicament, the *depth*-situation of what Dostoevsky calls "crime and punishment." What is operative in the phenomenology of ideas is Dostoevsky's

artistic–scientific mind which gives expression to what Ricoeur calls the “second naiveté” (i.e., the return of *Cogito* to being) in a non–substantial way (cf. SE, 356). It does not start with “things–in–themselves” (*Dinge an sich*) but rather with the phenomena, i.e., ideas.

1. *Why Phenomenology?* I must first explain why I introduce the theme of “phenomenology” into a study of Dostoevsky. If one follows *Crime and Punishment* from Part One to Part Six, then to the Epilogue, one will be made aware that any of the characters is a “thinking” person. He or she is portrayed and characterized by what he or she is thinking of. This is a method quite different from the ones used by other writers who portray and characterize a person in terms of his or her birth, status, occupation, culture, times, psychological traits, and looks. For instance, the retired clerk Marmeladov, whom the poor student Raskolnikov, on his way back from his reconnaissance visit to the old woman money–lender Alyona Ivanovna, met in a tavern, says: “I try to find sympathy and feeling in drink.... I drink so that I may suffer twice as much!” (CP, 16).<sup>23</sup>

True, Marmeladov is a tragic figure of the social disease, alcoholism, which Dostoevsky had long wished to depict. In that respect, it is in line with many of the social reportages, essays, short pieces, and short novels which described the poverty and suffering (especially the increase of crime, prostitution, and drinking) among the lower class urban inhabitants of the 1860’s.<sup>24</sup> But what Dostoevsky wants to depict is far more than that. Dostoevsky extracts Marmeladov’s “idea” of “suffering twice as much,” and portrays him from this perspective. In this case, the idea is not a purely objective knowledge, devoid of individuality, which one can assert without reference to one’s self. Rather, it is an “intention” or “inner reason,” the intention which is referred to, when one has attempted such and such a behavior, by the question: What is your intention of doing that? Phenomenologically speaking, this is primarily evident to us in any of our actions insofar as it involves our act of thinking.

When Dostoevsky portrays a character from the perspective of his or her "idea," it seems to me, he is neither insisting upon the possibility of its actual realization, nor making a transcendently oriented judgement as to whether it is true or false. On the contrary, he takes into consideration the doubtfulness of all this and yet only notes, as the most evident part of human existence, the fact that *he or she is always thinking*—i.e., the pure act of cogitation. This is the first reason why I want to bring the theme of phenomenology into the present study.<sup>25</sup>

The second reason. *Crime and Punishment* has three experimenters of ideas: Raskolnikov, Luzhin, and Svidrigailov. Each of their ideas is a fetishism of some sort, whether that of "conception," "material" (money), or "nothing" (debauchery). It is necessary here to notice that this does not mean that the author himself absolutizes any of these. On the contrary, Dostoevsky says nothing as to whether conception, material, or nothing is the reality. His concern is, rather, to focus upon, portray, and study as a human phenomenon, the mode of existence which the human being necessarily shows when he or she is involved in absolutizing any of these three components of human life. From Dostoevsky's viewpoint, therefore, when "conception," "material," or "nothing" is absolutized or regarded as ultimate, what we come across thereby is, more accurately, the fact that people are involved in three different intentions—namely, "conception-intention," "material-intention," and "nothing-intention," to use Husserl's secondary phenomenological category.<sup>26</sup>

2. *The Dimension of Temporality* First, I will deal with the dimension of temporality, i.e., the "experiment of ideas." This method is in line with Ricoeur's concern with the primary symbols in *The Symbolism of Evil*. The first case is Raskolnikov, who appears from the very outset as an experimenter of his own ideas. For Raskolnikov an idea, which one has not attempted to do, is simply "a fantasy to amuse myself," "a plaything" (CP, 4). Thus, in order to put into practice his own "new word" (CP, 4), he killed the old woman money-lender and her

sister Lizaveta who happened to be with her.

The murder was done, however, not purely subjectively or intentionally, but because “such an important, such a decisive and at the same time such an absolutely chance meeting [had] happened in the Hay Market (where he had moreover no reason to go) at the very hour, the very minute of his life when he was just in the very mood and in the very circumstances in which that meeting was able to exert the gravest and most decisive influence on his whole destiny” (CP, 62). That is, he had *happened* to hear in the Hay Market that the next day at seven o’clock Lizaveta, the old woman’s sister and only companion, would be away from home and that therefore at seven o’clock precisely the old woman *would be left alone* (CP, 63; italics mine); and he also had *chanced* to hear, from a conversation by two people at the next table in a miserable little tavern, of such a discussion and such ideas at the very moment when his own brain was just conceiving...the very same ideas (CP, 67; italics mine).

Dostoevsky then writes: “He went in like a man condemned to death. He thought of nothing and was incapable of thinking; but he felt suddenly in his whole being that he had no more freedom of thought, no will, and that everything was suddenly and irrevocably decided” (CP, 63–64). Or, “This trivial talk in a tavern had an immense influence on him in his later action; as though there had really been in it something preordained; some guiding hint...” (CP, 68). The core of this whole mental process Dostoevsky calls “casuistry” which “had become keen as a razor, and he could not find rational objections in himself” (CP, 72).

Then, what is the consequence of Raskolnikov’s murder of the two women as the experiment of his ideas? Dostoevsky goes on to describe: “Fear gained more and more mastery over him, especially after this second, quite unexpected murder” (CP, 81). He refers to Raskolnikov’s “shuddering all over with horror” (CP, 90), and to his “agonizing bewilderment,” “loathing

and horror," or "such despair, such cynicism of misery, if one may so call it, that with a wave of his hand he went on. 'Only to get it over!'" (CP, 94) "A Gloomy sensation of agonizing, everlasting solitude and remoteness," says Dostoevsky, "took conscious form in his soul" (CP, 103). Raskolnikov had never experienced such a strange and awful sensation: "And what was most agonizing—it was more a sensation than a conception or idea, *direct* sensation, the most agonizing of all the sensations he had known in his life" (CP, 104; italics mine).

This sensation is also called "an immeasurable, almost physical, repulsion for everything surrounding him, an obstinate, malignant feeling of hatred: (CP, 110). In short, the murder as the experiment of Raskolnikov's ideas has resulted in this: "The conviction, that all his faculties, every memory, and the simplest power of reflection were failing him, began to be an insufferable torture. 'Surely it isn't beginning already! Surely it isn't my *punishment* coming upon me? It is!'" (CP, 91; italics mine). This description of Raskolnikov's mental condition is strictly reminiscent of what Ricoeur calls "defilement," especially of the "impure" which is the physical manifestation of defilement (cf. SE, 27). In Ricoeur's system of the symbolism of evil, defilement is the first stage of primary symbolism followed by sin and guilt.

The next case is Luzhin. The idea of getting married to Raskolnikov's sister Dounia is one he wants to experiment. Propounding "the theory of the superiority of wives raised from destitution and owing everything to their husband's bounty" (CP, 44), Luzhin reckoned for marriage the helplessness of "the two destitute and defenseless women," Pulcheria Alexandrovna and her daughter Dounia (CP, 298). That means that for him "There can be no question of love" (CP, 45).

Luzhin then presented in his letter to Pulcheria his imperative request that Raskolnikov might not be present at their interview—"as he offered me a gross and unprecedented affront on the occasion of my visit to him in his illness yesterday"

(CP, 215). More precisely, this is because Raskolnikov asked Luzhin: "Is it true that you told your fiancée...within an hour of her acceptance, that what pleased you most...was that she was a beggar...because it was better to raise a wife from poverty, so that you may have complete control over her, and reproach her with your being her benefactor?" (CP, 150) Luzhin was afraid of Raskolnikov's insight into his true intention.

But Dounia insisted on her brother's coming to the interview. She thought it necessary so that if her brother was to blame he might ask Luzhin's forgiveness. And now, she wanted to choose between them, Luzhin and Raskolnikov, saying, "—it must be either you or he. That is how the question rests on your side and on his" (CP, 296).

But Dounia's words were of too much consequence to Luzhin because his basic attitude to her was this: "You say 'you or he,' ...I cannot let this pass considering the relationship and...the obligations existing between us" (CP, 296). That is to say, he could not admit a free will to choose in the person of a woman. As a result of this, the two women perceived his basic intention or motivation, that he thought they were completely under his authority (CP, 298). He finally turns out to be the person who is said by Dounia, his betrothed: "Pyotr Petrovitch, do be kind and go!" "You are a mean and spiteful man!" (CP, 300).

Dostoevsky makes an important concluding remark about Luzhin such as this: "The fact was that up to the last moment he had never expected such an ending; he had been overbearing to the last degree, never dreaming that two destitute and defenseless women could escape from his control" (CP, 300). Even though "...what he loved and valued above all was the money he had amassed by his labor, and by all sorts of devices" (CP, 301), it did not make any sense at last as regards love; his idea of experimenting the power of the money collapsed. Thus Luzhin is on the verge of what Ricoeur designates "ethical terror," or the interiorized status of defilement. Ricoeur insightfully

depicts this status as follows: "Man enters into the ethical world through fear and not through love" (SE, 30).

The third case is Svidrigailov. Raskolnikov saw clearly "that this was a man with a firm purpose in his mind and able to keep it to himself" (CP, 278). Really, he too is an experimenter of ideas. He listened from the room next to Sonya's to the full confession Raskolnikov made, word for word, to her, the only person who knew his secret. He made use of this for the purpose of his design on Dounia. Suggesting that "a very curious secret of her beloved brother's is entirely in his keeping" (CP, 472), he allured Dounia to have a meeting with him. After accompanying her to his apartment successfully, Svidrigailov told her everything he knew about Raskolnikov's murder.

"How can you save him? Can he really be saved?" Dounia sat down. Svidrigailov sat down beside her. "It all depends on you, on you, on you alone," he began with glowing eyes, almost in a whisper, and hardly able to utter the words for emotion (CP, 478).

Svidrigailov suggested that he would save Raskolnikov, he would send him away at once, by getting a passport because he had money and friends, capable people. So, what? "This is an outrage," cried Dounia, turning pale as death (CP, 479). She had not the slightest doubt now of "his unbending determination" (CP, 480). Suddenly she pulled out of her pocket a revolver, cocked it and laid it in her hand on the table. Svidrigailov jumped up. She raise the revolver, and deadly pale, gazed at him, measuring the distance and awaiting the first movement on his part.

But here Dostsoevsky writes: "He had never seen her so handsome. The fire glowing in her eyes at the moment she raised the revolver seemed to kindle him and there was a pang of anguish in his heart" (CP, 481). That is to say, Svidrigailov's idea "debauchery" was accelerated.

The first bullet grazed his hair. The second one missed fire. Dounia saw that he would sooner die than let her go.... But suddenly she flung away the revolver. Then, "A weight seemed to have rolled from his heart—perhaps not only the fear of death; indeed he may scarcely have felt it at that moment" (CP, 481).

"It," writes Dostoevsky, "was the deliverance from another feeling, darker and more bitter, which he could not himself have defined" (CP, 481). The life of debauchery stopped. Why? Because at that instance, though "...he might have seized her, twice over and she would not have lifted a hand to defend herself if he had not reminded her," "he felt almost sorry for her"; and "he had felt a pang at his heart..." (CP, 490). Soon afterward Svidrigailov pulled the trigger of the revolver Dounia had left and killed himself. Here we can see a disguise of what Ricoeur calls the "sublimation of dread." True, "to suffer punishment and pay the penalty for our faults is the only way to be happy" (SE, 43). But in the case of Svidrigailov, what took place is a self-punishment in the presence of his own super-ego, not before God.

There is a common factor of feature in the above three experimenters of ideas. Raskolnikov attempted a murder, Luzhin a marriage without love, and Svidrigailov an act of debauchery. All of those acts involved in their depths the actors' own unique "ideas" which they attempted to experiment. Raskolnikov deified his idea of "conception," Luzhin his idea of "material or money," and Svidrigailov his idea of "nothing" (which he thought was unbearable without involving himself in an act of debauchery). They lived respectively in a "conception-intention," in a "material-intention," and in a "nothing-intention." In this sense, they all manifest the phenomenology of ideas involving the afore-mentioned two motifs, the "pure fact of *congitationes*" and the "intentional mode of existence."

As a result of that, however, each of them has necessarily fallen into "self-abandonment," "alienation from love," or



"suicide." Why? This is the very problem which Dostoevsky, as far as I can see, wanted to describe and study under the theme: "crime and punishment." In my opinion, this problem lies beyond the scope of the two motifs of Husserl's phenomenology; and Dostoevsky's is a deeper phenomenology which represents methodologically the deconstructive part of his theology of literature and which therefore is identical with what Ricoeur intends by his thesis of the symbolism of evil. The examination of this problem will be carried out after a further elucidation of the "ideas" of the three characters in the light of a variety of dialogues they undergo.

3. *The Dimension of Spatiality* Therefore, our next task is to see the dimension of spatiality, or "interaction." This task is in line with Ricoeur's concern with the secondary symbols, i.e., myths, in his *The Symbolism of Evil*. First, Raskolnikov's ideas. These are revealed in his three dialogues with the examining judge Porfiry. Porfiry plays the role of reflection for Raskolnikov; the reflection is personalized in this figure. Accordingly, it functions not as a self-reflection but as a "dialogical intuition."<sup>27</sup>

In the dialogues Porfiry probes into the question of Raskolnikov: What is an "extraordinary" man, uttering a *new word*? He finds in it the core of Raskolnikov's ideas. Referring to Raskolnikov's article "On Crime," Porfiry proceeds to say: "There is, if you collect, a suggestion that there are certain persons who can...that is, not precisely are able to, but have a perfect right to commit breaches of morality and crimes, and that the law is not for them" (CP, 254). Raskolnikov replied: "I simply hinted that an 'extraordinary' man has the right...that is not an official right, but an inner right to decide in his own conscience to overstep...certain obstacles, and only in case it is essential for the practical fulfillment of his idea (sometimes, perhaps of benefit to the whole of humanity)" (CP, 254).

But now the problem is this: Who can know that he is an "extraordinary" man? And how can he give such right to himself? There must not then be any hasty conclusion or

imagination that he “is” a Lycurgus or Mahomet. It is precisely in this connection that Porfiry asks Raskolnikov this question: “When you were writing your article, surely you couldn’t have helped, he-he, fancying yourself...just a little, an ‘extraordinary’ man, uttering a *new word* in your sense...That’s so, isn’t it?” (CP, 260) That is to say, he has already found, in the identification of the superman-idea with Raskolnikov himself, the starting point of Raskolnikov’s crime. Here it is manifest that Dostoevsky is accounting for the “Beginning of fault” by narration—the fundamental function of myths according to Ricoeur (cf. SE, 163).

In the second dialogue, Porfiry, starting with the presupposition of Raskolnikov’s actual crime, analyzes the psychology of a criminal to such an extent that he goes to the heart of the problem, i.e., the *trap of subjectivity* peculiar to the person who intends to experiment an idea:

“He will lie—that is, the man who is a *special case*, the incognito, and he will lie well, in the cleverest fashion; you might think he would triumph and enjoy the fruits of his wit, but at the most interesting, the most flagrant moment he will faint.... He lied incomparably, but he didn’t reckon on his temperament. That’s what betrays him!” (CP, 335)

Thus Dostoevsky portrays the reflection of Porfiry’s upon Raskolnikov regarding the “End of fault” whose presentation is the eschatological function of myths according to Ricoeur (cf. SE, 163). This reflection shows, as Arimasa Mori rightly points out, that a rationalistic thought is in essence nothing but a form of nihilism.<sup>28</sup> This is the very fact that Dostoevsky wanted to demonstrate by his literary experiment. The problem of nihilism, however, is not, in my opinion, limited to Raskolnikov alone. We can see in all of the major characters in the novel the tragic dynamic of human intention, a dynamic by which human

intention inevitably falls into a trap. Therefore, the problem in question is not simply rationalism.

By the same token, Luzhin's major idea of "money" and also Svidrigailov's thought of "debauchery" have been disclosed by the roots in the midst of the dialogues. In the dinner in memory of the deceased Marmeladov, Luzhin accuses Sonia that she stole a hundred-rouble note when he and she were in the room of his friend Lebeziatnikov; but the truth, i.e., Luzhin's design, is penetrated by Lebeziatnikov—namely, that when Luzhin gave her a subscription of ten-rouble for her mother-in-law, he slipped the note secretly into her pocket, and that what Lebeziatnikov thought "private benevolence" (CP, 387) was in reality a trick of a "slanderer" (CP, 385). It is also revealed by Raskolnikov: Luzhin wanted to prove that Sonia was a thief so that he would show to Raskolnikov's mother and sister that he was almost right in his suspicions, that he had reason to be angry at Raskolnikov's putting his sister on a level with Sonia, that, in attacking Raskolnikov, he was protecting and preserving the honor of Raskolnikov's sister, his own betrothed (CP, 390); in short, Luzhin's object was to divide Raskolnikov from his family (CP, 389).

Svidrigailov the nihilist rejects "eternity as something beyond our conception, something vast, vast!" (CP, 283) "Instead of all that," he imagines, "what if it's one little room, like a bathhouse in the country, black and grimy and spiders in every corner, and that's all eternity is?" (CP, 294) Based upon such an imagination, he chooses a life of debauchery which he describes: "Here you have what is called *la nature et la vérité*, he-he!" (CP, 465). But this is disclosed, by means of his dialogue with Raskolnikov, as resulting from an unrelieved nihilism, a nihilism of boredom because of which he wants "something to fill up his time," i.e., debauchery: "For, you know, I am a gloomy, depressed person. Do you think I'm light-hearted? No, I'm gloomy" (CP, 464). And all this constitutes a fictitious structure of life, as he himself discloses: "Every one

thinks of himself, and he lives most gaily who knows best how to deceive himself. Ha-ha!" (CP, 466)

It may be important to conclude this section with the recognition that by his method of what I term the phenomenology of ideas, Dostoevsky proves into what goes beyond a mere phenomenon, i.e., human break-down. In this exploration he resorts to the synthesis of two dimensions in terms of his poetic expressivity. One is the time-dimension in which ideas are experimented and is comparable to Ricoeur's primary symbolism. And the other is the space-dimension in which ideas are artistically articulated in the midst of dialogues and is akin to Ricoeur's explication of myths as the secondary symbols.

#### IV. The Depth-Situation and the Appearance of Human Nature through Repentance

Now there opens up a new phase of Dostoevsky's theology of literature while at the same time cultivated methodologically by what I called in the preceding section "the symbolism of evil as a phenomenology of ideas." That is the appearance of complementary human nature as at once love and self-transcendence within the *depth*-situation of humanity. This appearance of human nature, I would assume, constitutes the message of Dostoevsky's theology of literature in *Crime and Punishment* as a theology "from below."

1. *The Depth-Situation* In the preceding section, we have discovered by a phenomenological investigation of the three characters' ideas as focused upon the point of intersection of the dimension of temporality (i.e., the experiment of ideas) and the dimension of spatiality (i.e., the interaction), an *unavoidable break-down of humanity* as the result of the experiment of ideas. This is the law of humanity permeating all of their actions. The real state of affairs is confessed by Raskolnikov with a heartbroken cry: "I went into it like a wise man, and that was just my destruction" (CP, 406); "I want to prove one thing only, that the devil led me on then and he has shown me since

that I had not the right to take that path, because I am just such a louse as all the rest" (CP, 407); "Did I murder the old woman? I murdered myself, not her! I crushed myself once for all, for ever" (CP, 407).

This is really what Dostoevsky wanted to depict under the title of "crime and punishment." Crime "is" punishment. As Raskolnikov admits before his friend Razumihin, "If he [i.e., the murderer] has a conscience, he will suffer for his mistake. That will be his punishment—as well as the prison" (CP, 259). A free project by the subject is nothing other than his own being projected into the project. This is a dynamic which penetrates any action or experiment of ideas.

Dostoevsky's conception of "crime and punishment," thus, goes deeper than the dimension of subjectivity.<sup>29</sup> He has discovered a real dynamic or law of humanity, a dynamic which never is apart from the human phenomena consisting of ideas, and which, nevertheless, factually precedes and essentially defines their forms and development. If we trace it back to its origin, this dynamic is necessitated by the fact that our life is singular and non-recurring, that we are abandoned to whatever we choose to live, the fact which is expressed by Raskolnikov: "I can live my life only once. I may therefore well be eager to live..." or by Marmeladov: "Do you understand, sir, do you understand what it means when you have absolutely nowhere to turn...?" (CP, 46-7) That is, one has experimented one's ideas in order to escape from one's limited and miserable existence, but only to find oneself in a new destiny, the dynamics of "crime and punishment." Then one has to cry with Raskolnikov:

...if he [i.e., someone who is condemned to death and is thinking of his life an hour before his death] had to live on some high rock, on everlasting tempest around him, if he had to remain standing on a square yard of space all his life, a thousand years, eternity, it were better to live so than to die at once! Only to live, to live

and live! Life, whatever it may be!...how true it is!  
(CP, 157)

The fact of abandonment was not only there once; even after one has attempted an action (i.e., an experiment of one's own ideas) in order to break through that fact, it is still constitutive of one's existence. There is, therefore, no other way for one than to live in this situation. This absolutely unavoidable situation I might call "the *depth*-situation" because it is *far from* both the happy objectivity of the common people and the existential subjectivity of the experimenters of ideas and yet is the *most crucial foundation* of life for all humankind. This term of mine stands as a "rational symbol" for the reality which is neither identical with nor apart from our sins. It is the "divine repercussion on humanity in revolt" or what Martin Luther designates the *opus alienum Dei*.

We then come to realize from the above examination that what Dostoevsky has elucidated is the same reality as Jean-Paul Sartre states: "Man is condemned to be free"<sup>30</sup>; or as Augustine's famous notion of "*non posse non peccare*" ; or as Paul's understanding of human freedom: "...since they [human beings] did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a base mind and to improper conduct" (Rom. 1:28). The experiments of ideas, as attempted by Luzhin, Raskolnikov, and Svidrigailov, which Dostoevsky has phenomenologically explored in order finally to discover the *depth*-situation, correspond, to my surprise, to the three levels of despair as clarified by Søren Kierkegaard in his *Sickness unto Death*, and to Blaise Pascal's three types of people, i.e., "those who choose to amuse themselves," "those who choose to praise man," and "those who choose to blame him," whom he blame equally (*Pensée*, Section 421). Indeed, Dostoevsky is doing artistic theology which accounts for the second naiveté "from below," that is, from the perspective of the *depth*-situation of humanity as "crime and punishment."

This is amazingly in parallel with Ricoeur's exposition of

“defilement” which culminates in the notion of the “sublimation of dread” (see SE, 40–46). On the negative side, this notion stands for the fact that “If a man is punished *because* he sins, he *ought* to be punished *as* he sins” (SE, 42). For this “ought to be,” seen through fear and trembling, as Ricoeur stresses, is the principle of all our reflections on punishment (SE, 42). On the positive side, the notion leads to the knowledge that “in the negative moment of punishment, the sovereign affirmation of primordial integrity is anticipated” (SE, 43). It is essential to our proposal for a theology of literature to recognize that the dread of avenging punishment is, as Ricoeur keenly discerns, the “negative envelope of a still more fundamental admiration, the admiration for order” (SE, 43).

## 2. *The Appearance of Human Nature through Repentance:*

*Love and Self-Transcendence* As hinted above, Dostoevsky's artistic theology, in our view, is not restricted to the elucidation of the “*depth*-situation.” Its *telos*, I would contend, is to investigate human nature as it appears within the *depth*-situation through repentance, a full-fledged, recuperative account of the second naiveté. Finally, we must therefore see the dialogues between Raskolnikov and Sonia in this regard.

“I wanted to find out then and quickly whether I was a louse like everybody else or a man. Whether I can step over barriers or not, whether I dare stoop to pick up or not, whether I am a trembling creature or whether I have the *right*....” (CP, 406) Thus Raskolnikov discloses the basic motivation of his murder as “self-transcendence.” But he, as Porfiry points out, fundamentally errs in that “he didn't reckon on his temperament [or nature]” (CP, 355).

In this respect, Raskolnikov's “self-transcendence” is decisively different from Sonia's “self-transcendence.” She is in the same “*depth*-situation” as his as he makes it clear by accusing her of being a prostitute: “...and your worst sin is that you have destroyed and betrayed yourself *for nothing*. Isn't that

fearful?" (CP, 316) "Tell me," he asks almost in a frenzy, "how this shame and degradation can exist in you side by side with other, opposite, holy feelings? It would be better, a thousand times better and wiser to leap into the water and end it all!" (CP, 316) To this Sonia replies: "But what would become of them?" (CP, 316) Her *love* for the mother-in-law Katerina and for her sisters is meant thereby. Love is the very thing that enables her to experience "self-transcendence" in the midst of the "*depth*-situation."

However, love has a problematic point as well. Raskolnikov fancies that what Dounia is intending by her marriage with Luzhin is a sacrifice for him. Dounia, on the other hand, won't admit that "she wants to do it out of charity!" (CP, 228) "Oh, base characters! They even love as though they hate...oh, how I hate them all!" (CP, 228) is his basic reaction. This leads to his final abandonment of them because he feels "a physical hatred of them" (CP, 270). Love has changed into an "egoism of suffering."

But in Sonia (and also in Lizaveta whom he happened to kill), Raskolnikov sees quite a different thing: "Lizaveta! Sonia! Poor gentle things, with gentle eyes.... Dear women! Why don't they weep? Why don't they moan? They give up everything...their eyes are soft and gentle.... Sonia, Sonia! Gentle Sonia!" (CP, 270) Her suffering is somehow free from egoism. Why? To this question another of Sonia's cries gives an answer: "What should I be without God?" (CP, 317) Here lurk what Ricoeur calls the themes of purification, mercy (*hesed*), and justification that are all integral to the history of pardon (cf. SE, 261, 272-78).

Thus Sonia's "self-transcendence," necessitated by and reflected in the "*depth*-situation," turns out to be both *love* and *faith*. At the final stage of the novel, this is further elucidated in the midst of the dialogue/confrontation over "self-transcendence" between Raskolnikov and Sonia.

"Let us go together.... I've come to you, we are both



accursed, let us go our way together!" (CP, 323); "I need you, that is why I have come to you" (CP, 323). So saying, Raskolnikov's love, however, has to confront the challenge of Sonia's "self-transcendence," insofar as he says: "You, too, have transgressed... have had the strength to transgress.... You might have lived in spirit and understanding" (CP, 323). When he disclosed his murder to her, Sonia cried in a frenzy, saying: "There is no one—no one in the whole world now so unhappy as you!" (CP, 399) She flung herself on his neck, threw her arms round him, and held him tight. She even said, "I'll follow you to Siberia!" (CP, 399) But when he asked, "Well, what am I to do now?," she gave him an order, an order severer than anything else:

"Stand up!" (She seized him by the shoulder, he got up, looking at her almost bewildered.) "Go at once, this very minute, stand at the crossroads, bow down, first kiss the earth which you have defiled and then bow to all the world and say to all men aloud, 'I am a murderer!' Then God will send you life again. Will you go, will you go?" (CP, 407)

Here the motif of "confession" resounds. The image of "self-transcendence," which Dostoevsky finally wants to illuminate and describe in *Crime and Punishment*, cannot come into existence without the confession of sins, that is, without the bringing to expression before the Sacred of the "depth-situation." As is literarily embodied in the story of Raskolnikov, what finally matters for Dostoevsky therefore is a total conceptual reversion of "self-transcendence"—from the one before one's own rational ego in terms of the experiment of one's ideas into the one in the presence of God (*coram Deo*) in terms of one's confession of sins.

This we can ascertain in part from the fact that he at first wanted, as he wrote to his brother, Mikhail, on October

9, 1859, to name the novel *The Confession*.<sup>31</sup> And it is important to note that now in the literary procedure of the novel "defilement" (as it is inextricably interwoven with the *depth*-situation *qua* "crime and punishment") has given way to the category of "sin" which, as Ricoeur rightly points out, can only be defined by the category of "before God" (SE, 50). Yet, sin is not the final category in the domain of the symbolism of evil. It has yet to give way to the category of "guilt"—the category which expresses, according to Ricoeur, above all, the promotion of "conscience" as supreme (SE, 104).

Thus "conscience" becomes the measure of evil in a completely solitary experience (SE, 104). But one's guilty conscience can find its salvation nowhere other than in the justification of oneself by grace through faith, thus transformed into the "justified" conscience (cf. SE, 148, 150). It is in this way that one changes one's way and returns to God—that is, one repents. And it is precisely within this framework of guilt that human grace—that is, "love"—is of great service to "transcendence," as manifest in Dostoevsky's portrayal of Sonia's love for Raskolnikov.

"Love" does not obliterate "transcendence," but points to it. By so doing, love empties itself and completes itself. We might call this feature of love the "self-negation of love." Sonia, therefore, had followed Raskolnikov 'on his painful way' (CP, 510) to the Hay Market. He understood her—who, as he at that moment felt and knew once for all, "was with him for ever and would follow him to the ends of the earth, wherever fate might take him" (CP, 510)—as "love" and as at the same time an "immovable declaration" or an "unchangeable decision" toward "transcendence."

"A look of poignant agony, of despair, in her face" (CP, 514) encouraged Raskolnikov toward the confession, i.e., toward his "transcendence," once again. For, tempted by the *pseudo*-transcendence as it expressed itself in a few words which Svidrigailov left in his notebook, namely, "that he dies in full

possession of his faculties and that no one is to blame for his death" (CP, 513-14), Raskolnikov once had gone out of the police station without confession. Sonia even followed him up to Siberia. His confession was merely formal, and lacked its real substance insofar as "it was only in that that he recognized his criminality, only in the fact that he had been unsuccessful and had confessed it" (CP, 526).

As a result of this, however, what surprised him most of all was "the terrible impassable gulf that lay between him and all the rest [of the prisoners]" (CP, 527). In other words, his isolation from them, or his loss of relationships with other human beings, was luring him into a feeling of the necessity of "transcendence." Therefore, on the other hand, "There was another question he could not decide: why were they all so fond of Sonia?" (CP, 527) In her, "transcendence" enabled "love."

But now, a reverse formulation becomes valid to Raskolnikov: "Can her convictions not be mine now? Her feelings, her aspirations at least..." (CP, 532) He came to realize "self-transcendence" *only through* "love." Dostoevsky expresses this procedure in this manner: "They were renewed by love; the heart of each held infinite sources of life for the heart of other" (CP, 531). "Love"<sup>32</sup> is the opportunity for "self-transcendence."

Thus, Dostoevsky has finally elucidated human nature as a bipolar actuality, or as a state of complementarity of "love" and "self-transcendence." With either of its poles absolutely incommensurable with the other, human nature is a principle comparable to modern nuclear physics' conception of the principle of complementarity of "waves" and "particles." According to Dostoevsky, this human nature has appeared through repentance within the *depth*-situation of humanity, a situation which has been illuminated by means of what I called the phenomenology of ideas. And this is the message of Dostoevsky's theology of literature as a theology "from below" in *Crime and Punishment*.<sup>33</sup>

## V. Concluding Remarks

I began this essay with the recognition that theology of literature is necessitated by the nature of the symbolism of evil as at once introspective and self-expressive, or private and public. It is the task of the theology of literature, as I formulated at the outset, to synthesize the private, concrete description of evil and the public, confessional adoration of God in terms of artistic creativity. Has Dostoevsky been successful in achieving this task? If so, how? Let me make two concluding remarks in reply to this question.

1. *Dostoevsky's Uniqueness* As shown in Section IV, 2, there is one thing quite unique in the theology of Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* that surpasses the requirement of the symbolism of evil. That is the fact that he depicts the appearance of human nature as at once self-transcendence and love against the background of the symbolism of evil. Now not only is the symbolism of evil both private and public, but human nature is also. More accurately, the former is dipolar because it is grounded in the latter. And this dipolar human nature is not a static substance which is self-same through time. Rather, it appears repeatedly anew through the symbolism of evil. Further, Dostoevsky's dipolar anthropology suggests that we can now re-formulate theological analogy as dipolar as well.

2. *Christ in Literature* As Ricoeur once said, Christology differs from philosophical anthropology combined with the symbolism of evil. By Christology Ricoeur means "a doctrine capable of including in the life of God itself, in a dialectic of divine 'persons,' the figure of the suffering servant which we evoked above as the supreme possibility of human suffering" (SE, 328). For him the figure of the servant of Yahweh, on the contrary, still belongs to the symbolism of human existence which is not on the level of a Christology. One of the most important indicators of this distance is the fact that in the Christ of the gospels the supreme tragedy or fate is unintelligible

except in the light of the "gift" because in His sacrifice the identity of "fate" and "gift" is realized, as a model for our action and suffering (SE,328, 329).

Then, what is the role of literature in portraying Christ? My answer: *it is an "analogical" embodiment "from below" of Christology.* By the term "analogical" I do not mean Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of Analogia Entis in which one can put before one's eyes the analogical relation that connects the second meaning in reference to God with the first meaning in reference to humanity. I mean instead Karl Barth's doctrine of Analogia Fidei in which "man's conformity with God which takes place in faith, and the 'point of contact' with the Word posited in this conformity" is "the sole work of the actual grace of God, [such] that the only final word left us at this point is that *God* acts in His word on man."<sup>34</sup> That is, God is at work in our analogical activity as "gift."

Yet my standpoint differs from Barth's in that I intend to radically widen the scope of analogy from the field of faith *per se* to that of literature. It is in this connection that, as mentioned in Section I, I prize John Cobb's insight into the hidden operation of Christ as the inner principle of transformation in Western art. This is typically true of Dostoevsky's literature. The final operator of his artistic creativity is Christ. In my opinion, in his novel *Crime and Punishment* Christ is at work in a dipolar way: On the one hand, he is the creative initiator of Raskolnikov's self-transcendence, while being, on the other, the co-sufferer with Sonia as the power of justification. This is why I referred earlier to the possibility of re-formulating theological analogy as dipolar.

Given these two conclusions, I hope I have succeeded in bringing to light hermeneutically-theologically the way in which Dostoevsky presents theological ideas in literary form such that they are made intelligible even to non-Christian readers such as those in Japan.<sup>35</sup>

## NOTES

1. For the modern reconstruction of Thomas Aquinas' *Analogia Entis*, see James F. Anderson, *Reflections on the Analogy of Being* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); George Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas and Analogy* (Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1960); Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1952); E.L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, 1949); Ralph McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961); Battista Mondin, *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd edn., 1968); G.B. Phelan, *Saint Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1941); and J.F. Ross, *Portraying Analogy* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981).
2. See Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I-IV, eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956-74). See also Mondin, *op.cit.*; and E. Jüngel, "Die Möglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf den Grund der Analogie. Eine Untersuchung zum Analogieverständnis Karl Barths," *EvTh*, XXII (1962), 535-57.
3. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology*, I, trans. G.H. Kehn (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970).
4. Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941, reprinted Hampden, CT: Archon Books, 1964).
- 4 a. For my overall view of the problem of theological analogy, see my article "Portraying 'Authentic Existence' By the Method of Analogy: Toward Creative Uses of the Analogy of Attribution *Duorum Ad Tertium* For Comparative Philosophy of Religion," *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No.1, 1992, 61-83; No.2, 1993, 27-50; No.3, 1994, 1-19.
5. Martin Luther, *Lectures on Romans*, ed. W. Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), p. 66.
6. For a systematic elaboration on Luther's confessional theology, see Rudolf Hermann, "Das Verhältnis von Rechtfertigung und Gebet nach Luthers Auslegung von Römer 3 in der Römerbriefvorlesung," in *Gesammelte Studien zur Theologie Luthers u. Reformation* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), pp. 11-43.
7. Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan

- (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 7. (Hereafter cited as SE.)
8. Cf. Maurice Blondel, *L'Êtra et les Êtres* pp. 225–26, quoted in Lalande, *vocabuaire philosophique*, art. “Analaogie.”
  9. For a renaissance period since 1945 for Christian writers and artists, including the Protestant Rinzo Shiina (1911–1973) and the Catholic Shusaku Endo (1923– ), see James M. Phillips, *From the Rising of the Sun: Christians and Society in Contemporary Japan* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1981), pp. 125–28.
  10. For example, we have more than two translations of every major work of Dostoevsky into Japanese. He is one of the non-Japanese writers whom journals (both academic and non-academic) feature most often, as did *Riso* (Ideal), No. 459 (August, 1971) which contained my own contribution—one of the materials I have developed in this essay.
  11. See Joseph J. Spae, *Japanese Religiosity* (Tokyo: Oriens, 1971), pp. 176–86; see also Peter F. Drucker, *The Ecological Vision: Reflections on the American Condition* (New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 1993), Part VII (“Japan as Society and Civilization”).
  12. Cf. Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the symbols of evil (such as “captivity,” “fall,” “error,” “perdition,” and “rebellion”) as “rational symbols” (aiming at the kerygma of “original sin” itself) in his *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermneutics*, ed. James Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 270.
  13. N. Berdyaev, *Dostoevsky*, trans. D. Attwater (London: Sheed & Ward, 1934), p. 25. (Hereafter cited as D.)
  14. John B. Cobb, Jr., *Christ in a Pluralistic Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), p. 31.
  15. E.H. Carr, *Dostoevsky (1821–1881): A New Biography* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), pp. 191–95.
  16. B.M. Engel'gard, “Ideologicheskii roman Dostoyevskovo” (Dostoyevski's Ideological Novel), in A.S. Dolinin, ed., *Dostoyevskii: Stat'i i materialy II* (Leningrad and Moscow, “Myst,” 1925), p. 91.
  17. Vladimir Seduro, *Dostoyevski in Russian Literary Criticism (1846–1956)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 210. (Hereafter cited as DRLC.)
  18. Bakhtin also understands that time itself made the polyphonic novel possible because Dostevsky was subjectively involved in the contradictory multiplaned existence of his time. But his point is that though this personal experience was profound, Dostoevsky did not give it a direct monologic expression in his novels.

19. M.N. Bakhtin, *Problemy tvorchestva Dostoyevskovo* (Leningrad, "Priboi," 1929), p. 45.
20. Bakhtin, *op.cit.*, Japanese trans. by K. Shintani (Tokyo: Tojusha, 1968), p. 49.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 51. According to Bakhtin, the age itself enabled the polyphonic novel to appear and Dostoevsky was a subjective participant in this contradictory, pluralistic reality of the times (*ibid.*, p. 43). But this does not, as such proponents of "socialist realism" as N.F. Bel'chikov and F. Yevnin assume, mean that the world of Dostoevsky's polyphonic novels is a direct reflection of the situation. Rather, for Bakhtin it is important that there is a parallelism *in method* between Dostoevsky's literary world and the situation of his times as it can be analyzed by the method deployed by Karl Marx in his *Das Kapital*. Compare, for instance, Bakhtin's notion of "sociology of consciousness" with Marx's notion of the "ensemble of social relationships." Whereas Marx deals with "goods" in his analysis of national economics, Bakhtin concerns himself with the function of "ideas" in Dostoevsky's novels. Cf. N.F. Bel'chikov, "Dostoevsky and Petrashevtsy" in "Pokazaniya F.M. Dostoyevskovo po delu petrashevtsy" (Testimony of F.M. Dostoevsky in the Petrashevtsy Case), *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, No. 45 (1931), pp. 130-46, and No. 46, pp. 160-78; F. Yevnin, "Novaya Kniga o Dostoyevskom (o Kniga V.Kirpotina 'F.M. Dostoyevskii')" (A New Book on Dostoyevskii: On V.Kirpotin's Book *F.M. Dostoyevski*), *Novi mir* (New World) (Moscow), No. 10 (Oct., 1947), p. 262 et al.
22. See also *ibid.*, p. 13.
23. All the quotes from Fyodor M. Dostoyevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, trans. Constance Garnett (Illustrated Modern Library, 1944) will hereafter be referred to likewise, as CP.
24. Cf. Yevnin, *op.cit.*
25. This is comparable to Husserl's reference to the "cogitationes" as the first absolute data. See Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 2.
26. Cf. Husserl, *ibid.*, pp. 22, 35-36.
27. Bakhtin, *op.cit.*, Japanese trans., p. 92.
28. Arimasa Mori, *Dostoevsky oboegaki* (A Memorandum on Dostoevsky) (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1962), p. 9.
29. In this respect, Dostoevsky surpasses Husserl's identification of the "teleological interconnections within cognition" with the self-givenness of the transcendent (cf. Husserl, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-48). Cf. J.H. Pos's critique of Husserl: "Our subjectivity,



- even if it is a transcendental one, cannot set up by itself the framework and contents of a certain *ex post facto* experience" (Maurice Merleau-Ponty et al., *Problems actuels de Phénoménologie* [Declée de Brouwer, Paris, 1952]; Japanese trans., by N. Takahashi [Tokyo: Serika, 1961], p. 97).
30. J.P. Sartre, *Existentialism & Humanism*, trans. P. Mairet (New York: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), p. 34.
  31. See Leonid Grossman, *Dostoevsky: A Biography*, trans. M.Mackler (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1975), p. 342.
  32. As is clear above, "love" is a positively feminine principle for Dostoevsky. This is conspicuous in comparison with the male domination in Ricoeur's *The Symbolism of Evil*. Although Ricoeur accounts for femininity in Part II, Chapter III, Section 3, "The 'Lapse of Time' of the Drama of Temptation," what he means by an "eternal feminine" is the "mediation of the weakness, the frailty of man" (SE, 254), not a positive character such as compassion. Incidentally, this element of compassion, in my view, may be crucial in order to reduce a high rate of "recidivism" in the American correctional system today. Those who have never experienced mercy and kindness in their lives cannot know how to live emotionally outside the walls of confinement. See Jack Henry Abbott, *In the Belly of the Beast: Letters from Prison*, with introd. by Norman Mailer (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), pp. 59, 105, 107-7, 126. Cf. also Jeffrey H. Reiman, *The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and Criminal Justice* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), pp. 2. 139-69.
  33. Interestingly enough, this message is congruent with Ricoeur's scheme of thought in *The Symbolism of Evil*. In the chapter entitled "The 'Adamic' Myth and the 'Eschatological' Vision of History" (Part II, Chapter III), there is at one point an interesting reference to the "How much more" of the grace of God (cf. Rom. 5:15), which then leads to "in order that": "God has shut up all in unbelief in order that he may have mercy on all" (Rom. 11:32; cf. 5:20-21). Here we can find the same *telos* of new creation of humanity as that given in Dostoevsky's message above (see SE, 272-75). As shown above, Dostoevsky presents the message in terms of the dialogues (i.e., mythical narrations) between Raskolnikov and Sonia. Likewise, Ricoeur states: "The symbolism of the eschatological judgment swells the meaning of the notion of pardon, because it relays to the level of symbols of mythical degree [i.e., secondary symbols] the primary symbolism of 'justification' which we have interpreted in our

study of guilt" (SE, 276).

34. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I/1, trans. G.T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1931). p. 280.
35. One of the reasons why Dostoevsky's novels (esp. *Crime and Punishment*) appeal to the Japanese mind may be that the theology of literature inherent in them strongly resembles the Buddhist logic of the Four Noble Truths the Japanese are familiar with. We might compare Section IV, 1 above; Section III; Section IV, 2; and Section II respectively with the four truths: (1) suffering (Pali, *dukkha*); (2) the origin of suffering—Delusion (*avijja*); (3) the cessation of the origin of suffering—Enlightenment (*nibbana*); and (4) the way to salvation—the Middle Path. The ultimate Buddhist salvation, however, lies not in a God but in Enlightenment or the realization of the self as Emptiness. See my essay "A Christian Interpretation of the Four Noble Truth," in Gary W. Houston, ed., *Dharma and the Gospel* (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1984).