

Hume's General Point of View and Smith's Impartial Spectator

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1. Introduction

Hume and Smith both developed moral theories that are based on the key concept of 'sympathy'. Many suppose that Hume and Smith share a similar understanding of sympathy as it signifies their moral sentiments theory. However, this paper will show that this assumption is untrue. Sympathy as viewed by Hume and by Smith equally signifies a departure from Francis Hutcheson's moral theory. It is interesting to discuss how the two systems arrive at very different philosophical destinations.

Hutcheson's moral theory is based on the core concept of benevolence, according to which virtue consists in being benevolent to others. Hutcheson's idea is a philosophical application of the Christian ethic of loving one's neighbour. With the emergence of a commercial society, however, a new type of moral theory was needed. Hume criticises Hutcheson's assumption that man is born with a moral sense capable of perceiving benevolence, and substitutes that sense with the mechanism of sympathy.

This distinction in the concept of sympathy implies that the central locus of morality shifts from the meritorious moral capacity of an individual to the relationship that individuals create in their social context. Hume's concept of sympathy is that it functions as a basis of human relationships in that it is the mechanism for transforming the impressions of other people into one's own after receiving them in the form of ideas. Because people are capable of sharing the impressions of others, they can have a common understanding about a situation, which then leads to proper communication between people.

Smith's theory, by virtue of the advantage of being published later than Hume's, is also developed from Hume. He adopts the concept of sympathy from Hume as the core concept of his moral philosophy. Most important of all, Smith develops his concept of 'the impartial spectator' from Hume's concept of 'the general point of view'. According to Hume,

moral sentiment can be appropriate when it is obtained from the general point of view. On the other hand, Smith holds that the sympathy of an impartial spectator represents the moral standard that everyone should accept for attaining a proper moral relationship. An action can be approved when an impartial spectator 'can go along with' the motivation of an agent. Smith does not doubt the priority of the right over the good in an action, and criticises Hume for basing the morality of an action on its utility.

Therefore, it is only natural that Smith develops his concept of the impartial spectator as the grounds for justification. He also intends in his revision of 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments' to criticise Mandeville's moral theory, which is based on 'vanity'. Eventually, this concept of the impartial spectator develops into one's conscience as the role of the 'all-seeing Judge' who overrides the verdicts of actual spectators. This also means that Smith, by equating moral criteria with the verdict of God, abandons the fundamental function of sympathy as the basic principle of communication among equal people, and falls back to a theological position in this matter.

It is interesting that Hume develops his theory of sympathy while dealing with the human phenomenon of 'pride' as an obvious alternative to 'vanity'. Contrary to Smith's misunderstanding, Hume does not regard utility as the criterion of approval. Nor does the function of the general point of view consist in measuring the utility of an action. Hume's general point of view is not a puerile form of Smith's impartial spectator, but rather signifies the following two characteristics that are not found in Smith's impartial spectator. First, a 'general' point of view is distinct from an 'impartial' point of view. Hume would not describe it as impartial because impartiality is a value-ridden concept that needs further analysis. Second, a point of 'view' is distinct from the 'judgement' of a spectator. Views can be held by anyone, but a spectator's judgement is based on his own consideration that will need further justification. For this reason, Smith eventually identifies his impartial spectator as a substitute for God. Hume's general point of view, on the other hand, is not inherited by specific persons. It is general as opposed to specific, and consists in enabling people to avoid conflicts while reaching agreement on the

meaning of a moral situation.

Both Hume's 'general point of view' and Smith's 'impartial spectator' represent the core characteristic of their theories, and are necessary for the development of their respective understanding of sympathy. The striking difference between the two systems can be traced to their fundamental attitudes toward 'the design argument'. Smith's hidden but constant theme is to prescribe the way of bringing God's providence into this world. Smith considers the problem of worldly order in the tradition of Scottish Calvinist theology. Smith's impartial spectator demonstrates how God's design is realised on earth differently from the way the invisible hand realises providence despite ignorance of people seeking to satisfy their individual interests. Hume, however, uncompromisingly criticises the design argument, and establishes his alternative based on 'custom' that embodies generality. Hume's general point of view represents the way man forms a spontaneous order, as distinct from the providence of God. This also explains why Hume and Smith have different explanations regarding justice. For Smith, justice ultimately means the approval of God; for Hume, justice can be reduced to people's mutual self-interest that is recognizable from the general point of view.

Hume's achievement can best be understood in contrast to the theory of his best friend and the most distinguished contemporary philosopher, Adam Smith. Fundamentally, Hume's criticism of causality proves to be an attempt to replace God's providence with a human order formed around the general point of view. Hume's philosophy destroys the possibility of a divine harmony, and shows how order, epistemological, psychological, moral, and political, develops from human nature.

2. Historical Background

Reaction to Hobbesian doctrine dominated the moral philosophy of the 17th and the 18th century both in England and in Scotland. Cambridge Platonists criticized Hobbes' materialism while developing a deistic doctrine. John Locke, in his reliance on the faculty of reason, was in part an heir of their legacy. Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke's student, denied, under an influence from Roman classics, the atomistic and egoistic picture of human beings, and emphasized their social nature.⁽¹⁾

He called the intuitive capacity that harmonizes the whole universe and individuals 'moral sense'. Francis Hutcheson, in his efforts to defend this concept from the attack of Bernard Mandeville, developed the doctrine of moral sense. According to Hutcheson, the morality of an action was recognized by moral sense when the action was based on benevolence.

While being influenced by Hutcheson in his emphasis on the importance of sentiments as the basis of morality, Hume introduces a different perspective from Hutcheson. Unlike Hutcheson, Hume does not presume moral sense which is inherent in human beings, and exclusively deals with perceptions that are both moral and non-moral ones.

It is interesting to note the historical situation in which these philosophers competed to present their theories. There was an emerging civil society. It would be possible to define civil society in many ways, but here it is enough to confirm that modern civil society is an industrious and commercial society in which the basic assets shift from land to money, and where a substantial number of the general public rather than a handful of aristocracy dominate.

Most simply, Hutcheson's answer to this new situation was to promote 'more benevolence'. Hutcheson thought that, as society expanded, more benevolence would be needed to meet the wider range of social communication. He formulated the ideal of the virtue of the universal benevolence as 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' that was later famously used as the basic tenet of utilitarianism by Bentham. Hutcheson's notion of benevolence was modelled on Christian love.

Hume could not be satisfied with Hutcheson's solution. The central principle of Hume's associationist psychology already represents the decisive reason why the Hutchesonian solution is unacceptable. According to Hutcheson's principle, the human mind is so constituted that one tends to feel stronger affection to those who are closer to him. In accordance with the distance one is from the person, one tends to feel a stronger or weaker affection. Hence there can be no universal benevolence. Human beings cannot enact universal benevolence not because they are morally wicked but because of the fundamental psychological constitution of human beings. This understanding reflects Hume's basic procedure of not assuming any normative understanding

when he deals with the elucidation of morality.⁽²⁾

3. The difference of sympathy between Hume and Smith

Hume's concept of sympathy signifies the most remarkable departure from the Hutchesonian moral theory. The basic function of sympathy in Hume is to convert ideas into impressions.⁽³⁾

Hume does not deny benevolence as virtue; it merely is not adopted as the basis of Hume's moral system because of his moral epistemology. Hume's exclusive dealing with perceptions enables him to present a theory which explains the dynamic formation of a new society, or a society whose central characteristic lies in its being constantly fluid: a constant flow of money, goods, and people. Smith obviously allies with Hume in this understanding. He shares the same attitude with Hume in that he focuses on the human relationship rather than a static moral characteristic inherent in individual human beings independent of and prior to social interactions.

Smith starts his argument by introducing his concept of sympathy. It is well known that the concept of sympathy in Smith as well as in Hume is used as a uniquely technical term. The most crucial function of sympathy in Smith is to enable people to approve of a person in a moral situation. This already signifies a crucial departure from Hutcheson's theory that focuses on the characteristics of a virtuous person. Sympathy is first possible when there are human relationships. In other words, by focusing on sympathy, morality becomes a matter of human relationships, rather than of the meritorious characteristic of a virtuous person.

Let us be reminded that Smith indicates in the 4th edition of his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* a subtitle, which reads 'An Essay towards an Analysis of the principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of their Neighbours, and afterwards of themselves'. The subtitle is significant because it informs us of the two important features of his theory. First, it is a theory of a moral judgement. Second, Smith presupposes both the person who makes a moral judgement and his neighbours who are to be judged. And the morality of the person himself is to be judged after the manner that one judges his neighbours, i.e. by regarding himself as his neighbour.

Therefore, in Smith, sympathy is an important means of making a moral judgement rather than representing any specific sentiment like benevolence. Smithean sympathy obtains where there is a concurrence of sentiments between the person who observes the situation and the person who is affected by the action. One imagines oneself to be in the situation of other people, and compares the sentiment of other people with the one he would feel were he in the position of the person observed. If the two sentiments are the same in degree, then sympathy obtains. An occurrence of sympathy signifies approval, and an absence of sympathy signifies disapproval.

Smith observes as a fact of human nature that sympathy is in itself a pleasant sense of harmony between people, and the natural agreeableness of experiencing the approval of other people urges one to seek for sympathy. Seeking the approval of others is alleged to be the strongest inclination of human beings second only to self-preservation. This is the Smithean reason to be moral. Generally, an observer, as a third person, tends to have a weaker sentiment than the person primarily concerned. Therefore, in order to attain sympathy most effectively, the observer should try to raise the level of his sentiment, and the person primarily concerned should try to lower the level of his sentiment so that even the third person 'can go along with' his sentiment toward the situation. In most cases, primary and stronger efforts are required of the person affected rather than the observer. Sympathy thus established signifies the stable human relationship between people, and can guarantee the stability of a society. It is to be remembered that the stability of a society specifically signifies the stability of the sentiments of the people in the society.

Smith's explanation sensitively captures a new kind of human relationship in an expanding commercial society where the dominating human relationship is that with an indefinite number of anonymous persons. In such a society, one has to behave in a way that is approved by people with whom he has no contact either beforehand or afterward.

4. Problems of Smith's Theory of Sympathy

However, some problems immediately seem to follow from Smith's

theory. First, as Haakonssen points out⁽⁴⁾, Smith does not explain how it is possible for a spectator to recognize a sentiment or a motive of a person apart from the action itself performed by that person. The emotion of other people is hidden behind the veil of privacy; the motivation of an action is not a direct object of observation. In order for a comparison to be possible, one has to be able to recognize the emotion of the other person with a reasonable degree of accuracy.⁽⁵⁾ But it does not seem to work in any efficient manner, if the other's emotion is not in principle knowable.

Second, according to Smith, a moral observer primarily deals with the emotion of an actor, and sees whether he 'can go along with' it, were he in the place of that actor. But the motivation of an action is not usually an emotion, nor can the motivation be merely reduced to an emotion. So if the spectator tries to evaluate the propriety of the motivation, he has to use some other criterion than simple emotion to see if the motivation is appropriate. But this will cause Smith to abandon his theory of moral sentiment.

Furthermore, Smith provides us with a still more difficult problem. According to Smith, in order for sympathy to obtain, bilateral efforts are required; one is required on the part of an observer to strengthen his emotion, and the other is required on the part of the person primarily concerned to weaken his emotion. These two efforts, when combined, first enable the concurrence of two different emotions. It is not, however, clear how it is possible for a third person to supervise these bilateral processes, unless they engage in a face-to-face negotiation like in a market.⁽⁶⁾

Smith assumes that harmony of people's sentiments signifies in a precise manner the harmony of the whole reality of the society and the harmony of human relationships in the society. But it is only an unwarranted presupposition that a condition of an emotion represents the reality, and that the harmony between the emotions of different people designates the harmony of the underlying reality.

5. Impartial Spectator

Smith is not unaware of these problems. Smith thinks that, in a society

that is composed of anonymous people, one's behaviour can be moral when people who have no prior personal relationship with him approve it. In this case, it would not be necessary to make sure that no one has objection about the verdict. Because an anonymous member is the objective criterion, if one representative spectator acknowledges some behaviour, it means that the action has obtained the recognition of the society as a whole.

When Smith first introduces the concept of an impartial spectator in the first edition of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he means by the concept just such a spectator.⁽⁷⁾

And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us (TMS p.25).⁽⁸⁾

To behave morally means to behave in such a manner that an impartial third person would approve of it. When the moral behaviour of other people is approved by a third person, the behaviour is supposed to be approved unanimously by all the members of the society. This represents a minimum morality.⁽⁹⁾ And this third person is what Smith means by the impartial spectator. Smith's impartial spectator specifically refers to an ordinary person who has no personal interest in the situation. Moral behaviour is impartial not because of its inherent impartiality but because of its being approved by an impartial spectator.

One of the problems that are indicated above sees the possibility of solution with the notion of the impartial spectator. It would not be necessary for both parties to make an effort to attain the concurrence of their sentiments. The sentiment of the impartial spectator functions as the standard for correct moral sentiments. Now all that is necessary for obtaining propriety is to adopt the sentiment of an impartial spectator.

People can make a right judgement about themselves only if they can pretend themselves a third person when considering their own morality. Let us remember that this signifies the understanding of morality that regards 'social validity' rather than any particular normative position as the standard of morality. Therefore, the fundamental characteristic of the impartial spectator is that he is considered as a representative of an ordinary member of the society, and not as a God-like being, omniscient, omnipotent, and universal.

6. Smith's Demigod

However, Smith's doctrine takes a crucial turn regarding the concept of the impartial spectator. It is in a sense a development that is waiting to happen. Soon after the publication of the first edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Gilbert Eliot questioned how it was possible in Smith's theory that one's conscience could go against popular opinion.⁽¹⁰⁾ In response to this criticism, Smith adds a major correction to the role of impartial spectator in the 2nd edition of the *Theory of Moral Sentiment*.⁽¹¹⁾ Smith hopes in his letter to Eliot that upon the reading of the 2nd edition,

[Eliot] will observe that it is intended both to confirm my Doctrine that our judgements concerning our own conduct have always a reference to the sentiments of some other being, and to show that, notwithstanding this, real magnanimity and conscious virtue can support itself under the disapprobation of all mankind.⁽¹²⁾

This distinction already presupposes the difference between actual praise and the praise-worthiness. In its essence, this is typically a question regarding vanity.⁽¹³⁾ Vanity is defined as an attitude to love praise itself even if one is not at all praiseworthy. It is to be noted that the distinction between actual praise and praise-worthiness is exclusively concerned with a moral evaluation about oneself. In so far as one acts as a disinterested spectator, there can be no contradiction between the actual praise and praise-worthiness.⁽¹⁴⁾ Smith says that the problem of conscience is peculiar to self-evaluation. 'Conscience' orders without regard to, and often in defiance of, public opinions. This is precisely the

development that Smith announces in the subtitle of his book. Smith proceeds to analyse the principles by which men naturally judge the conduct and character of themselves.

In the 2nd and especially in the 6th edition of Chapter 2, Part 3 of the *Theory of Moral Sentiment*, Smith discusses in detail the differences between actual praise and praise-worthiness, or actual blame and blame-worthiness. The underlying implication of his criticism of vanity is Smith's criticism of Mandeville. It is in this process that he introduces the concept of 'demigod' or 'the man within the breast' (TMS p.131).⁽¹⁵⁾

Smith thinks that the love toward praise-worthiness cannot be derived from the love of praise itself. For, the love of praise is desirable only when the praise is given to the action that is truly praiseworthy. The point is that, here, praise-worthiness has the priority over the actual praise. Smith refuses to base the desirability of praise-worthiness on the actual praise from the public. And the reason why praise-worthiness has priority is that it is nothing but the verdict of the conscience. This is founded upon Smith's theory that prescribes the priority of the right over the good. And the strict correspondence between the right and the good can be found nowhere else other than in the presupposition that the sympathy of an impartial spectator should always be correct.

Then Smith takes the course of escalating his dependency on the theological assumption from the impartial spectator to 'the demigod within the breast' and to 'the all-seeing Judge of the world' (TMS p.131), from the first tribunal by the actual spectator, to the tribunal of conscience and further to 'the unerring rectitude' of God's 'great tribunal' (Ibid.).⁽¹⁶⁾ This is precisely the reverse course that Smith undertook as he first introduced the concept of sympathy as a critical departure from Hutcheson.

The development of the concept of Smith's moral observer is in a sense a necessary consequence of his theory of sympathy. Smith thinks that sympathy is a process completed in the mind of the observer who is equipped with his own moral criterion. Therefore the justification of sympathy ultimately depends on the qualification of the observer. So long as sympathy is supposed to be the initial moral criterion, there is no other means for deciding the priority among competing moral opinions,

other than by examining the persons who hold each opinion, rather than the contents of the opinions themselves. That is why Smith upgrades the impartial spectator from ordinary people, to the inner man, to the great demi-god within the breast, and finally to the all-seeing Judge.

In this way, Smith's impartial spectator attains a viewpoint of seeing all. However, this 'all-seeing Judge of the world' is anything but the ordinary people who constitute the society to which Smith tries to give philosophical foundation.⁽¹⁷⁾

7. Smith's Criticism of Hume and Hume's General Point of View

In the last part of this discussion, I have tried to highlight the theological aspect in which Smith founds the last resort of moral worthiness in divine providence. It would be wrong to regard it as a negligible reminiscence of his time. Smith criticizes Hume on the ground that the consideration of result can never be the ground of moral value. Although Smith does not mention the name, presumably out of 'propriety' to his best friend, there are some places in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* that Smith apparently has Hume in mind as his target of criticism.

In their well-known correspondence, Smith confirms that his concept of sympathy differs from Hume's.⁽¹⁸⁾ In spite of Hume's sarcastic tone, it is not of course a minor difference of opinions, and Smith's whole theory tries to present his alternative to Hume's work.⁽¹⁹⁾ Most important of all, Smith classifies and criticises Hume's theory as a doctrine that seeks the principle of approval in utility. Let me quote the relevant passages.

The utility of those qualities (NB intellectual virtues that command our admiration), it may be thought, is what first recommends them to us; and, no doubt, the consideration of this, when we come to attend to it, gives them a new value. Originally, however, we approve of another man's judgement, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality: and it is evident we attribute those qualities to it for no other reason but because we find that it agrees with our own. Taste, in the same manner, is originally approved of, not as useful, but as just, as delicate, and as precisely suited to its object. The idea of the

utility of all qualities of this kind is plainly an after-thought, and not what first recommends them to our approbation (TMS p.20).

That system which places virtue in utility, coincides too with that which makes it consist in propriety. According to this system, all those qualities of the mind which are agreeable or advantageous, either to the person himself or to others, are approved of as virtuous, and the contrary disapproved of as vicious. But the agreeableness or utility of any affection depends upon the degree which it is allowed to subsist in. Every affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds. According to this system therefore, virtue consists not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the affections. The only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure of this proper degree (TMS p.306).

Smith apparently understands Hume's sympathy as based on utility. But Smith's understanding needs correction. First, Hume is not a utilitarian in that he does not maintain that what increases the total utility of a society is morally good. He maintains that what is morally good is perceived as such because of its causal effect that is either utility or agreeableness, and nothing else. Sympathy is a means to obtain those perceptions before the agent is ready to make a moral judgement. This assumes the priority of the good over the right, which is opposit to Smith's idea. If moral judgement is, as Smith claims, only concerned with the propriety of sentiments, its role is to tell if something is right or wrong. It cannot explain the formation of the moral norms.⁽²⁰⁾

Hume's sympathy explains how it is possible that people can share the sentiments of other people even if they do not experience the same situation in person. In this way, Hume's sympathy is a means of communication, and explains the mechanism by which we share the moral situation. On the other hand, Smith does not explain how it is possible for a spectator to recognise a moral situation in the first place.⁽²¹⁾

Smith takes it for granted that the spectator and the agent can share an understanding of the situation. But that is an illegitimate leap that Hume determines not to allow in his 'Science of Man'. Smith with the development of the concept of impartial spectator chooses, in effect, to make his theory of sympathy a monologue or an inner dialogue with God, which is to be compensated for by divine providence. His separation of efficient cause from final cause corresponds to this picture.⁽²²⁾

The theological assumption of Smith's theory is not to be found in his explicitly theological phrases⁽²³⁾, but rather in his multi-layered assumption that the individual human being has a vicegerent within his heart, and that the moral judgement based on his sentiments represents the harmony of a well-ordered society.

Unlike Hume, Smith's adherence to natural law theory and his reliance on final cause has prevented him from developing a theory based on efficient cause.⁽²⁴⁾ Smith's moral philosophy deals with the theory of judgement that occasions the moral order based on providence; while Hume tries to explain the formation of the moral order itself from human nature.

Unlike Smith's notion of the impartial spectator who sees all, Hume's general point of view provides a view that is only general. Hume's general point of view is not even a device for judgement, but merely represents a perception of the situation. Sentiments of sympathy obtained from the general point of view assume a generality in the sense that they are in principle accessible to people in general, because, unlike Smithian impartiality, it does not primarily depend on a particular faculty of the observer. And the perception of the observer naturally prescribes the most appropriate action to be taken in a situation. In this way, Hume's moral perception explains moral motivation.

In Hume, morality has more to do with the fundamental orientation of human behaviour that is represented by custom, rather than some specific rules for sorting out behaviour among independent individuals.⁽²⁵⁾ Humean sympathy works on behalf of the person concerned, while Smithian sympathy works on behalf of divine providence. This is reflected in the fact that Hume's theory of justice explains how human

relationships come to be harmonised with the emergence of civil society, while Smith deals with the commutative justice by presupposing independent individuals in order to maintain the already established social order.⁽²⁶⁾ Therefore, despite their chronological order, Smith's moral philosophy cannot be a development of Hume's 'Science of Man.'⁽²⁷⁾

NOTES

- (1) Grean, S., "Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics", Atens, 1967, D. D. Raphael, "The Moral Sense", Oxford, 1947.
- (2) This is the attitude of anatomist as opposed to that of a painter. Also, Hume seems to follow the principle of natural law philosophers such as Grotius or Hobbes that no normative attitude should be presupposed in order to derive a universal theory of morality.
- (3) See my "The concept of Sympathy in Hume's Moral Philosophy: Its function and Problem", *Bulletin of Keiwa College* 7, 1998.
- (4) Knud Haakonssen, *The Science of a Legislator*, Cambridge, 1981, p. 48.
- (5) In this respect, Hume does not suppose that the spectator's sympathy deals with the hidden motive.
- (6) This has to do with the distinction between the natural price and the market price in Smith.
- (7) The other virtue is humanity. It means to have most sympathy for other people. Self command and humanity represent the two most important sources of Smith's moral philosophy, stoicism and Christianity.
- (8) Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Oxford, 1976. Thereafter the citation will be made as 'TMS' followed by the pagination in parenthesis. It is important to notice that the principle of sympathy is in fact the combination of two of the Smith's most important virtues: humanity that consists in sharing the sentiments of other person, and self-command that consists in containing one's own sentiments. These two virtues represent the two most important sources of Smith's moral philosophy, Christianity and Stoic philosophy, respectively.⁸ The virtue of humanity is required of the spectator (or the person who regards himself as a spectator). On the other hand, the virtue of self-command is required of the person primarily concerned. Of the two virtues, self-command is more important, because an observer cannot in principle share the violent sentiments of the person primarily concerned, and unrestricted sentiments cause the observer an aversion and thus disapproval. Without self-command, one cannot take a position of an observer, and self-command means to love oneself with the humanity which is available even to other person. Therefore the two virtues are in fact the two sides of the same coin.
- (9) Smith even maintains that the beauty and ugliness of one's face is the product of the opinion of other people. He says 'We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who

judges with impartiality between us (TMS p.135).'

- (10) *On Moral Sentiments: Contemporary Responses to Adam Smith* ed. John Reader, Thoemmes, 1997, pp.18-30.
- (11) Smith has witnessed the case in which the actual observers do not always make an appropriate judgement both in person, as in the Calas case, and in general observation, as can be seen in his critical observation of the corruption of the wealthy middle class in his *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. It was Smith's distinctive contribution that he designated the sympathy of an ordinary third person of the community as the moral criterion in the emerging new society. But the corruption in reality and his tendency as a civic moralist induces him to model the moral judge on theological image.
- (12) See Reeder (1997) p.19, D. D. Raphael "The Impartial Spectator" in *Essays on Adam Smith* ed. by Andrew Skinner (1975) p.91.
- (13) The problem of 'vanity' has been the central, if inconspicuous, problem in the history of Western philosophy. Especially, in pre-modern British philosophy, it occupies a central place because of the intellectual challenge made by Hobbes and Mandeville, and because of the influence of Christianity. Hume develops his theory of sympathy centring on the concept of 'pride and humility' apparently in defiance of traditional Christian virtue, and converted it as the base of social unification.
- (14) That is derived from the problem of how to base the non-empirical concept, self, within the framework of empirical explanation.
- (15) In the 2nd edition, Smith still represents an ambivalent position between public opinion and conscience. Raphael points out that 'On the one hand Smith wanted to retain the traditional view that the voice of conscience represents the voice of God and is superior to popular opinion. On the other hand he believed that conscience is initially an effect of social approval and disapproval; in the first instance, *vox populi* is *vox Dei*. 'The Author of nature has made man the immediate judge of mankind, and has in this respect, as in many others, created him after his own image, of his brethren (TMS p.128).'

Although developed conscience is a superior tribunal, 'yet, if we enquire into the origin of its institution, its jurisdiction, we shall find, is in a great measure derived from the authority of that very tribunal, whose decisions it so often and so justly reverses (TMS p.129).'

In the 6th edition, the above quotations are removed as Smith emphasises the priority of conscience. However, if the impartial spectator reaches different verdict from the opinion of the general public, it must be because the impartial spectator possesses his own criterion of moral judgement. However, Smith does not explain the reason, nor does he think it necessary to give one. It is based on a certain self-evident presupposition.

- (16) Cf. Raphael (1975) p. 94.
- (17) According to Smith, our 'happiness in this life is thus, upon many occasions, dependent upon the humble hope and expectation of a life to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in human nature; which can alone support its lofty idea of its dignity; can alone illuminate the dreary prospect of its continually approaching

mortality, and maintain its cheerfulness under all the heaviest calamities to which, from the disorders of this life, it may sometimes be exposed (TMS p.132).'

- (18) See Reeder (1997) p.13.
- (19) See (TMS p.327).
- (20) Normativity concerns more with moral recognition than with mere approval or disapproval.
- (21) Smith distinguishes moral recognition from moral approval. But this in fact makes moral sentiments redundant for moral recognition, because any objective recognition of a moral situation alone should correspond to one moral judgment.
- (22) In the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith tried to establish the theory of earthly justice, by presupposing the God's justice. But, in Smith, because the earthly justice is modelled on the high tribunal of God, it is made possible only through the direct intervention of the providence of God.
- (23) Cf. (TMS pp.128-130, p.166).
- (24) Cf. Clark, C.M.A., "Adam Smith and Society as an Evolutionary Process", *Adam Smith Critical Assessments*, Vol. VII, Routledge, 1994, pp.151-168, esp., pp.163-164.
- (25) See my "Custom as the Humean Alternative to Locke's Abstract Ideas" *Bulletin of Keiwa College* 10, 2001.
- (26) See my "Justice and the Stability of Property in Hume" *Bulletin of Keiwa College* 9, 2000.
- (27) This paper was delivered at the conference "The Scottish Enlightenment in its European Context" at *The University of Glasgow*, April 2001, under the auspice of *The British society for the History of Philosophy*.