

Comparative Content Analysis between the US and Japanese Media during the Run-up Period of the Iraq War

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Introduction

This study investigates the relationship between the media and politics over the Iraq War by extensively analyzing the contents of both US and Japanese two leading newspaper: *the New York Times* and *the Asahi*. Specifically, this work focuses on the run-up period of the war. The-six-months period before the war in Iraq was crucially important not only for determining the course of the conflict, but also providing the basic ground of several international schisms, such as the discrepancy between the US-UK alliance and some continental European countries.

The main goal of this study is to discover both the differences and similarities of the political communication systems between the US and Japan. The two countries are virtually saturated by the media, such as around-the-clock television coverage and a wide variety of newspapers, many of which have a circulation with millions. Yet, the content analysis of this study finds that the two allies have quite distinctive treatments of the war during the run-up period, especially their rationalization of the cause of the Iraq War, and role and the power of the United Nations in relation to the war.

I . The Iraq War and the Media

The war in Iraq (the Iraq War, the Second Persian Gulf War) and its aftermath is, without a doubt, one of the biggest news events in this decade. The war was fought between a "Coalition of the Willing," consisting primarily of American and British forces, but also including Polish, Australian, and Iraqi forces. Approximately 250,000 United States troops, with support from 45,000 British, and smaller forces from other nations, entered Iraq primarily through a staging area in Kuwait (Milbank, 2003).

The war lasted only for 42 days from March 20 to May 1, 2003.

President George W. Bush's announcement of the end of the "official combat" (May 1, 2003), however, was not the end of the ramifications of the warfare. It was only the beginning: numbers of Iraqi insurgent attacks have been dominating the news since then until, at least, the fall of 2005, when this essay was written. The official number of U.S. troops who have died in the Iraq war hit 2,000 by October 25, 2005 (White and Tyson 2005). According to the Iraq Body Count, the number of civilian death toll in Iraq is about between 26000 and 30000 by the end of October 2005. Also, kidnapping and subsequent murders of civilians from the US and other allies, including Japan, have terrified audiences of the media all over the world. The revelation of several military scandals, most notably the Abu Graib incidents, provided us an occasion to second guess the meaning of this war.

The Iraq War was probably the most media-centered conflict war in history. More than 1500 journalists from around the world, including Japanese, entered the battle zone. They attempted to report what was happening on the battlefield, analyze next developments, and explore the new world order after the demise of the Saddam Hussein's regime. Some 600 of them are actually embedded with the coalition forces during the combat. Also, "unilateral" independent journalists joined the camps of journalists (Kurtz, 2003). Not only newspapers and televisions, 24-hour cable and satellite networks, but also numerous numbers of internet blogs reported latest developments and delivered their analyses.

We witnessed significant and interesting aspects in the relationship between the media and the politics during the war in Iraq. Especially, the US media's role in the war has been a matter of concern for scholars and the media organizations themselves. Since the war ended, a great amount of literature has been produced to argue the role in the war---much has been written about the media by media critics, and many critical self-examinations by journalists themselves. 'Mea culpas' have been abundant, particularly after David Kay, former U.S. chief weapons inspector, announced in early 2004 that "we were almost all wrong" about Iraqi weapons of mass destructions (Achenbach 2004).

A number of these criticisms sharply point out the weakness of the media

in the battleground. Those works suggest that the US media has played a cheerleading role to the Bush Administration, and that the media promoted the war without serving as a watchdog of the government. Some critics call the US media's role in the war "weapons of mass deception." because the media had put an emphasis on supporting the war effort of the Bush administration over reportorial objectivity (Schechter 2003). Not only in the US, but also in Europe and Asia, including Japan, literature cast doubt on the functions of the media during the Iraq War (e.g. Ishizawa 2005).

One obvious example is the controversial role of a New York Times reporter Judith Miller. Miller's serial reporting on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq garnered the public support for the initiation of the Iraq War. The reports, however, were later shown to be false. Miller's coverage indeed had depth, but the depth was formed by a series of propaganda statements of the Bush government (Van Natta, Liptak and Levy, 2005).

As shown by the Miller's case, objectivity is one of the most difficult issues in war reporting. Since the attacks of 9/11, there has been an active discussion over manipulation of the media by the Bush Administration (Cole, 2005). Karl Rove of the Administration and his media team have worked a great deal in public relations. Especially during the run-up period of the Iraq War, many critics argue that the Administration was very skillful in emphasizing the need and urgency to attack Iraq. The Administration superbly presented the dichotomous arguments between "us and them" or "good and evil." These presentations of the Administration include the contrast between "despotic and Al Qaeda-related" Hussein regime and "democratic and free" US, or "procrastinated and with loopholes" UN inspections and US's "serious attempts to end the terror network." Since the Bush Administration was more skilled in providing these images than their counterparts, such as the Hussein Administration or the UN inspections teams, the US media constantly resorted to the Bush Administration as the primary source of the news. Thus, not only the people in the US, but also relatively large portions of the international community, came to believe such self-serving presentations.

On initiating attacks in Baghdad, the Administration also introduced another method to control the content of the media in the battlefield. The Administration allowed journalists to embed in specific military units in the

War. Although journalists were experiencing unprecedented access to the battlefield and their stories would be very real, there were concerns for the cost of embedded journalism. First, there were numbers of restrictions in reporting because embedded journalists had to sign a contract restricting when and what they could report. The details of military actions could only be described in general terms and journalists were not allowed at all to report possible future missions or about classified information they might find. Also, the commander of an embedded journalist's unit could declare a 'blackout' in filing stories via satellite for security reasons. More importantly, it was assumed that with or without being conscious, embedded journalists are more likely to be sympathetic toward the coalition forces, even if a journalist doesn't necessarily want to be. This is because embedded journalist's lives were at the mercy of the fate of his/ her troop, and as such of the "Stockholm syndrome" was created. The syndrome describes how an onlooker becomes part of that group. The "embeds" are protected by the US forces and their lives are in the hands of the forces (Brandenburg 2005). Thus, objectivity may be lost under such extraordinary conditions.

Since the end of the war, scholars have attempted to define the impact of embedding journalism. These studies are in the preliminary stages, and the results are mixed. Although one study finds that the embedding experiment actually distorted the media content (Pfau, et al. 2004), another concludes that the impact is relatively small (Aday, Livingston and Hebert, 2005). Now it is assumed that scholarly debate over the impact of embedding will not end for some time.

The Bush Administration also attempted to affect the language being heard in the media. There were always plenty of euphemisms about the Iraq War. One of the most widespread terms emerging by the Administration during the War is "shock and awe," a bombing campaign by the coalition forces designed to terrify an enemy into submission. Also, other jargons of the Pentagon came to be frequently used in the media during the war. One example is "to decapitate." The US media came to use phrases such as "the coalition forces tried to 'decapitate' the Iraqi regime," to describe the concept "it tried to kill Saddam Hussein." In addition, the more familiar term 'collateral damage' was frequently used to indicate Iraqi civilian casualties. There are acute criticisms about the new phrases that the government has

crafted to describe its reaction to the war. Critics argue that some reporters were quick to adopt the Administration's new terminology which simplify the complications, and sanitize the battle. These terms present a reality which lacks an understanding toward the impact and scope of the military actions. Consequently, the media may eventually mislead the public (Bowers, 2003).

This battle euphemism is one of the legacies of the First Gulf War of 1991. During the first Gulf War, the military supplied attractive battlefield pictures that journalists found difficult to refuse. The military also could bar press access to potentially embarrassing scenes and persuade the public that such restraint was necessary for national security. Critics suggest that the war became a picture-book war that glorified skills of military leaders and largely concealed the bloody realities of the combat. Along with videos, new terms were created by the senior Bush Administrations during the First Gulf War. These terms include "pinpoint attack" or "smart bombs." These technological terms disguised plenty of botched results lacking in accuracy. However, because of the technological superiority of the US, audiences came to believe in the excellence of the attacks and in a minimum amount of civilian damage even if not many people exactly knew what "smart" means (Hachten and Hachten 1996).

II. Research Design.

1) Methods

This study employs both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles. Content analysis is a research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text (Weber 1985). Content analysis is a frequently used method in political communication research to determine generalizations of the content of recorded instances of communication, such as newspaper articles, speech texts, and academic textbooks. The chief strength of content analyses (both quantitative and qualitative) is that they enable us to study occurring messages in media. Using quantification, quantitative content analysis can be a systematic method for understanding the particular traits of media messages or news contents. By contrast, qualitative content analysis attempts to investigate the underlying content in the text or to define the "purpose" of the text the

author intentionally (or sometimes unintentionally) wants to deliver to the readers (Hofstetter 1981).

Using content analysis methods, this work compares US and Japanese media coverage during the run-up period of the Iraq War. Articles of *the New York Times* and *the Asahi Shimbun* in Japan, both of which are leading newspapers of the respective countries, are investigated. Both papers are considered as politically liberal. Articles are collected from two databases, the Asahi Shimbun database (*Kikuzo*), and the *LEXIS-NEXIS* (the New York Times). Regarding the Asahi, the newspaper has morning and evening daily papers except on Sundays and holidays, and both versions are examined. Although the Asahi has five different regional editions, this study uses the Tokyo edition, which is circulated in the metropolitan Tokyo area.

One of the focal points of this content analysis is the investigation into whether same issues and events are portrayed in similar or different ways between US (as represented by the New York Times) and Japanese (as represented by the Asahi) media. In other words, the question is whether the media contents over Iraq were socially constructed differently by the media of two different countries. In order to conduct this analysis, special focus in this part of content analysis will be on the "media frames," which are the narrative structures the news media provide (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The media present "frames" by providing readers with a fairly common view of the major actors, events and themes. Understanding how the adoption of a particular media frame will be accounts for the construction of news stories and interactions among various antagonists in reporting the war in Iraq.

Since the media deliver those reports in order to fit those frames and see the events with certain viewpoints, those reports tend to have some storyline(s). These storylines are sometimes hidden and difficult to observe in ordinary news stories. They are, however, likely to become very clear in big news events. This is because the news media doesn't want its audience/readers to be inundated with numerous, but unconnected new findings. Big news events continuously generate an abundant number of articles or television newsfeeds, and the media unintentionally or intentionally has to present the news with familiar storylines. Also, for the purpose of satisfying its audience/readers, the media often features human interest stories in big news events. These stories, however, are likely to be

one of the common episodes we have often heard. Since the war in Iraq is, without a doubt, a fairly big news event, there is ample data for media frames and media storylines in reporting.

Another important part of the content analysis is the identification of the sources of news, which presents clues to understanding the flow of information. In war reporting, flows of information are crucial to reveal the propaganda of the government. The identification of the sources determines who is in charge of disseminating information, and also who wants to propagate their own purpose for the war. Also, it may highlight the power relationship among political actors and reveals the agenda-setters of policies. A critical question at the heart of news coverage is, indeed, whose perspectives will be heard.

2) The Time Frame and Major Events during the Run-up period of the Iraq War.

The period to analyze is from the US Congressional approval on Iraqi attack (October 1, 2002) to one day before the beginning of the Iraq War (March 19, 2003). During that period, the NYT had more than 4000 articles that contain a word "Iraq," and the Asahi had more than 3000 articles that carry the word "Iraku" (Iraq in Japanese). Those articles included unrelated stories such as one in a sports or entertainment pages. This study analyzes articles that feature the Iraq issues. In total 1242 NYT and 990 Asahi articles which mainly featured Iraq have been selected to be analyzed.

During the run-up period of the War, the United States related to international affairs in a crisis mode. The US continued to fight the "war against terror," which is a consequence of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Although the alleged links between the Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime were not proven, the War in Iraq was prepared based on the perceptions that Iraq was on the side of the terrorists.

There are several important developments during the run-up period. First, the US Congress authorized an attack on Iraq on October 11, 2002. Second, the UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1441, which imposed tougher new arms inspections on Iraq on Nov. 8. After 2003 began, the war became more and more inescapable. On January 28, President Bush announced in his State of the Union Address that he was

ready to attack Iraq even without a UN mandate. Although only Spain and Bulgaria supported the idea, the U.S. and Britain seriously lobbied to garner support for a strike on Iraq among UN Security Council members. Finally, at 5:30 a.m. Baghdad time on March 20 (9:30 p.m. US Eastern Standard Time, March 19), the U.S. launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. The war in Iraq began.

This work does not include the prior events to this period. Critics suggest, however, the Bush administration had steadily prepared for the war. Bush stated in his State of the Union Address that Iraq was part of an "axis of evil" (January. 29, 2002). Also, Bush publicly introduced the new defense doctrine of preemption in a speech at West Point (June 2, 2002). Based on this preemption doctrine, Bush asked the UN to swiftly enforce its own resolutions against Iraq on September. 12, 2002. Bush also stressed that if the UN did not follow his suggestion, the U.S. must act on its own.

III. Major Results of the Content Analysis

There are significant differences in media reporting in the United States and Japan in the five months prior to the war in Iraq. During this period, the two countries' media show sharp distinctions in many ways, especially in the degrees of how much the media is supportive of US governmental decisions and how much the power the United Nations has. Also, the two newspapers have different accounts of the imminence of the US invasion of Iraq. One of major storylines of the New York Times is that the second Gulf War was imminent because Saddam Hussein was not cooperative with United Nations' nuclear inspections. By contrast, an Asahi's dominant storyline is that the United States must not rush to start any military actions, although Saddam Hussein was not cooperative and a terrible despot. Also, striking difference is found between the two media in their description of certain incidents in the War, such as civilian casualties. As a result, the two countries' leading media have portrayed different "realities" of the War in Iraq, as if two different wars were developing at the same time. In the following, five major storylines of the two papers are explained in detail.

1) US policies of Iraq

The two media organizations emphasized different storylines. The NYT's

most featured articles are "US policies over Iraq," but "international relations" is the Asahi's most common major storyline during this period. While 65 % of the articles of the NYT contains some reference of the American policies over Iraq, only 32 % of the Asahi articles refers to the US actions. Instead, 49% of the Asahi articles refers to UN diplomacy or the relationship between the UN and other countries, such as France, Germany and Japan.

During this period, the New York Times uses large portions of the Iraqi stories to discuss the next possible actions by the Bush Administrations. Compared with the Asahi, it is very noticeable that the articles of the NYT attempted to deliver to their readers a very concrete analysis of the Administration's actions. This may, however, raise the question of objectivity during the war. As mentioned before, objectivity is one of the most difficult tasks in war reporting. To a staff writer at the NYT, these stories are written based on "correct" information from their news source. But the problem is that the more they follow "accurately" their particular news sources that coincide with the government's position, the closer their stories become to government propaganda. As a consequence, the writer has played the role of cheerleader to the Administration, although what the writer wants to attempt is to be as objective as possible. In this way, many stories of the New York Times were framed from the perspective of the Bush Administrations. Accordingly, the stories of the NYT present a relatively favorable position to the pre-emptive attack on Iraq.

In contrast to the New York Times, the Asahi has been consistently critical toward the Bush Administration's policy over Iraq. Yoichi Funabashi, one of the most famous editors in the newspaper reiterates during this period his disagreement with the US policy over Iraq. Writing in an article named "An Open Letter to the Bush Administration" (October 8, 2002), he presents his argument against the Administration. Funabashi says, "[I]f the United States overreacts militarily, there is also the fear that it could lead to more war." Thus, he believes that the US should not rush and act on the Iraq crisis in light of long-term national interests.

Also, it is clearly noticeable that the Asahi reports much less information about the American side. While the Asahi frequently quotes comments of the officials of the Bush Administration, the paper does not share large

portions of the US government's views over Iraq issues. Regarding Bush Administration's contemplation of the war, the Asahi does not report the possible plans of attack or degrees of preparations.

The Asahi's anti-Bush "media frame" becomes obvious in November 2002 when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announced his decision not to join the coalition forces as a way to oppose the Bush Administration's policies over Iraq. Both the NYT and the Asahi featured the Schroeder's decision in several articles. The NYT's articles focus on losing the help of the former ally in the First Gulf War. Asahi's tone, nonetheless, is somewhat laudatory. The Asahi indicates that the decision by the Schroeder Administration appears to be rational while it seems to find that the US's policies over Iraq have become too bellicose.

It is important to suggest that the Asahi's frame of news does not reflect the Koizumi Administration's official positions at all. The Koizumi Administration has supported the US policies over Iraq. During the run-up period, Prime Minister Koizumi publicly expressed support for the US's effort to fight against terrorism and criticized Hussein's unwillingness to cooperate with UN weapons inspections. Koizumi also quickly announced his support for the US-led coalition fighting in Iraq when the War actually started, saying that he expected people in Japan would understand the decision of the Bush Administration.

In the Asahi, there is a clear pattern in its anti-US tone of stories. First, Asahi's foreign correspondents in the US, mostly stationed in Washington, D.C. and New York, report the latest actions of the Bush Administration's policies over Iraq. It seems that those correspondents implicitly or explicitly select the news appropriate for their Japanese audience. Thus, relatively simple contents, such as officials' press conferences, are often selected from the information they obtain in the US.

Second, along with these foreign correspondents' reporting, commentaries written by commentators and editors in Asahi are attached. Scholars' commentaries are sometimes added as well. They often criticize US expansionism through these commentaries. These commentaries openly criticize US expansionism and imperialism after the 911 attack. They are very critical against the US position over Iraq, especially the Bush doctrine, which is a combination of new sets of foreign policies, such as the pre-

emptive war and the right of the US to pursue unilateral military action, if necessary. These commentaries often deliver relatively simple plots. For example, one commentary suggests that after the 911 attacks, the US turned into a warmongering nation which rushes into a war, not for the elimination of the terrorist networks, but for the purpose of benefiting their own country, such as securing oil interests in the Middle East.

Regarding uses of commentaries, there seems to be something in common among commentators whom the paper chooses. They appear to share similar point of view about the Iraqi issues to that which the Asahi often presents in its previous stories and editorials. In an interview article of Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and one of the most famous scholars of international relations in Japan, many of her remarks sound familiar to readers of the Asahi. She basically points out that the way the US has prepared for the War in Iraq is problematic because although Hussein has been dictatorial, the link between the War on Terror and the overthrow of the Hussein regime is not firmly established (December 11, 2002).

Third, the Asahi features the US actions' possible impact on Japanese politics. This includes reactions from Japanese legislatures, officials, and the public and dispute over the possible dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. Since the Asahi has been very negative toward both the Bush doctrine and the overseas dispatch of the SDF, these articles usually accentuate unfavorable opinions about helping the Bush Administration.

2) Imminence of the War with Saddam

It is essential that the two media differently recognize the feasibility and the imminence of the war with Saddam Hussein. While the New York Times reported in this period that the war is imminent, the Asahi's major storyline is that the war is only a possibility. Especially, after the US Congressional resolution to use force to the Iraqi regime, the NYT's storyline indicated that the question is not whether to start the war, but when to start the war. In contrast, the Asahi often suggested that the most important agenda is to find the WMD, not to refer further discussions over sanctions toward Iraq.

One conscious media frame that the New York Times employs is that "war is imminent and inevitable." An article ("The Hazardous Path Ahead,"

October 11, 2002) suggests that information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency made clear that "how difficult it will be to manage an escalating crisis in Iraq in ways that assure a constructive outcome." Also, even before the Congressional resolution to attack Iraq was passed, this article even reports about the Bush Administration's post-war governance of Iraq. According to the story, Washington must be mindful "to establish a postwar Iraqi government that does away with Saddam Hussein's weapons programs and reflects the desires of Iraq's diverse population." The story also suggests that the administration has already warned Iraqi military officers that they risk prosecution for war crimes.

Another article of the NYT ("Testing Iraq on Arms Inspectors," October 1, 2002) suggests that the problem is that Iraq has "never fully complied with the [UN] resolutions, which contain no meaningful deadlines or enforcement provisions beyond the continuation of increasingly porous economic sanctions." Several articles of the New York Times' op-ed page are more clearly framed stating that the "war is imminent and inevitable." A typical article is written by a conservative columnist, William Safire. He calls for ousting Saddam Hussein in an article ("Saddam's Last Ploy," October 7, 2002). According to Safire, without the regime change, the destruction of all potential weapons of mass destruction is impossible. Although not explicit, many articles of the NYT', including the Safire column, imply that "the evil" is the Iraq regime and that "the good" is the United States. This "good vs. evil" dichotomy is that frame that the Bush Administration employed and it was the most basic storyline of the NYT during the run-up to the war period.

In contrast, the Asahi basically maintains its assertion that there must be a way not to initiate a military conflict, even though the US believes that the war is inevitable. The Asahi seems to insist that renunciation of war is the fundamental strategy for the world peace as if there were no other better alternatives for maintaining international security. Because of this fact, many, if not most, articles of the Asahi appear to be holding a very strong anti-war sentiments.

In the last minutes before the war started, the anti-war rhetoric of the Asahi becomes very emphatic. The editorial dated one day before the War began ("There is No Justification for the War," March 20, 2003) suggests

that there is global opposition to the war, and the international community is very suspicious about America's motives. Also, the article argues that the Bush Administration is "rushing into war unilaterally" at the cost of the authority of the United Nations. Thus, the paper repeatedly suggests that there is no reasonable justification for the War in Iraq.

Regarding the urgency of the war, another pivotal difference between the two papers is how much the anti-war protests are covered in their papers. The Asahi, frequently refers to more anti-war activities around the world than the NYT does. In an article regarding the "human shield" in Iraq, the Asahi reports Japanese civilian volunteers' anti-war tactics to deter the coalition forces from attacking Iraq (March 13, 2003). Although the paper quotes a Japanese official's warning not to enter Iraq for safety reasons, many articles are more sympathetic to the anti US activists' position.

3) Roles of the United Nations

Another crucial difference in reporting between the two media during this period is about the role and the strength of the United Nations. The gap regarding the UN stories between the two media is supported by quantitative analysis. In terms of frequency, the United Nations was mentioned in 36% of the articles from the Asahi, but in only 15% of the articles from the NYT during the run-up period.

Frequent storylines that the New York Times adopts is that "UN inspection is not effective enough to rectify the deeds of Saddam." The NYT is generally very skeptical of the inspections. Thus, the limit of UN inspection in Iraq is reiterated in the NYT stories and eventually leads to emphatically pointing out the impossibility of any peaceful solutions. While the paper often refers to the importance of diplomatic solutions to prevent the conflict, the calls for such as deliberant policy are frequently juxtaposed to the fact that Saddam Hussein has procrastinated to reform his Administration for a long time after the First Gulf War. In addition, it is interesting that in the NYT articles most of the quotations from the Iraq officials are framed as "phony." Especially, Mohammed Saeed al-Shahaf, the Minister of Information of Iraq government, is often the subject of derision by the paper.

What is characterized as even more different is the degree to which the

UN is effective. The Asahi's stories have a tendency to refer to the UN as if the organization can decide "the fate of the world." According to the Asahi, the UN is a very powerful organization, which seems to be an ultimate, omnipotent police regarding world order. By contrast, the NYT has more focus on the domestic actions regarding Iraq. In the NYT's articles the UN also has a strong impact on international security and can decide on the direction of the inspections and sanctions. The UN, nonetheless, appears in the articles to be only a place to negotiate, and its decisionmaking regarding sanctions is perennially dragging.

In an article, the NYT admits that the United States cannot defeat Al Qaeda without the help of dozens of other nations, and stresses the deliberation not to give way to the use of force until peaceful paths to Iraqi disarmament become impossible ("The Rush to War" March 3, 2003). However, the article's position about the use of powers is based on a very realistic world view. The article says, "[w]e are not under any illusion that Mr. Hussein is disabling his missiles simply because he likes the idea. . . The U.N. must realize that whatever success it has achieved of late in getting Iraq to abide by its directives has come only because of American military might." Here we find that the NYT's basic perspective regarding the use of military forces is quite different from that of the Asahi. While the NYT is relatively realistic in dealing with Iraq, the Asahi seems to believe that denouncing military attack is a starting point toward resolving the tension among nations.

Moreover, the basic frames of the issue are quite opposite between the two media. One of the Asahi's major storylines is that "the evil" may be the US, and "the good" is the international community, most notably the United Nations. This is in sharp contrast to the NYT because one of the American newspaper's basic storylines connotes that "the evil" is the Iraq regime and "the good" is, as mentioned, the United States

4) Civilians Casualties

In the run-up period, it is interesting to compare the two media regarding how they refer to civilian casualties and damages. While 39 articles in the NYT contain some reference to civilian casualties and damages, the Asahi shares twice as many articles (44) as the NYT (21) regarding the impact on

civilians. Also, Asahi's emphasis on civilian suffering is demonstrated not only by the number of articles but also by their contents.

The war's impact on the people in Iraq seems of little interest to journalists in the NYT. Only four of the articles focus on "Iraqi casualties" as their main topic during this period. Nine articles feature "coalition casualties" as their main topic. A lack of attention on the victims of war is one aspect of neglecting their culture and society, as well as dehumanizing an enemy. Since the war had not started yet in this period, many of these references to casualties are assessments of a possible number once the war would begin.

Instead of featuring Iraqi casualties, the NYT features the Bush Administration's preparation to conduct an "ethical war". Many of the NYT articles explain Bush Administration's attempts to reduce "collateral damage," the terminology the Pentagon uses to refer to civilian casualties and damages which are "unavoidable accidents" (or "by military") in the war. Several articles report new weapons to reduce "collateral damage" (e.g., "Talking Aim at an Enemy's Chips" February 20, 2003). Another interesting article ("Battle Plan: Spare Iraq's Civilians" February 23, 2003) explains in great lengths that "damage control" has become a standard part of mission planning, unlike the war in Vietnam. According to the article, the Bush administration has designed an air campaign that tries to avoid destroying bridges, roads and other public works so that country can be rebuilt quickly, and peoples' daily lives are not completely disrupted. Also, the Administration has instructed its planners to select targets where homes, schools and mosques are least likely to be damaged and even required them to calculate whether bombs that drift off target might hit civilian targets.

In another article of the NYT ("Ethical War? Do the Good Guys Finish First?" March 8, 2003), the paper also suggests that there is a limitation for such an "ethical war". The article points out that the problem is that "collateral damage" control becomes so important for every aspect in military operations that military personnel sometimes cannot effectively attack the enemy. According to the article, since American military policy requires legal advisers to approve combat targets in advance, "clearance delays and denials allowed important Taliban and Qaeda members to escape unscathed" during the War in Afghanistan. Also, the article emphasizes the

difficulty of distinguishing between civilians and military personnel in an actual battlezone.

While the NYT's articles present the vague possibility of civilian damages, the Asahi describes more seriously, sometimes emotionally the impact with which the war affects civilians in Iraq. An Asahi article ("There is No Reasonable Justification for Iraq War" March 20, 2003) suggests "Even if the war ends quickly, as America hopes, it will still have to bring Iraq and its capital to submission with quite a different outcome from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Many innocent civilians will be killed or harmed in the process. This conflict may well throw the world into unexpected chaos."

5) The News Sources

Also, in the run-up period of the War, the content of the two media are quite different in light of their news sources. While the NYT often quotes from officials of the Bush Administration as well as members of Congress and scholars, the Asahi largely depends on a US government's spokesperson, such as the press secretary. Also, it is notable that the Asahi features one government official more frequently than others. The official is Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, who is famous as a Japanese specialist. Although the NYT quotes Armitage as well, the presence of Armitage in the Asahi is very conspicuous. Each time Armitage appears in public lectures, the Asahi seems never fail to feature him. The Asahi seems to believe that Armitage remarks are trustworthy source to understand the Bush government's official views on Iraq and to assess future US policies over Iraq.

Also, the newspapers' choice of commentators differs sharply. As mentioned above, the Asahi mostly features scholars. The NYT commentators are, however, more varied from scholars and former military personnel to technology analysts of weaponry.

IV. Findings and Analyses

There are four major findings for this research.

Findings 1 : The US and Japanese news media framed quite differently the War in Iraq.

Findings 2 : The US and Japanese news media show quite different patterns of sympathy and antipathy toward the US-led forces in the Iraq War.

Findings 3 : The Japanese media's approach to the Iraq War is a less military-strategy centered and more diplomacy oriented than the US media.

Findings 4 : The Japanese news media put more importance on the civilian casualties in Iraq than the US media.

Regarding Findings 1, it is concluded that the US and Japanese news media quite differently framed the War in Iraq. Since mass media reporting is closely associated to its countries' politics, society, and public opinion, there are significant differences in how the media tended to frame the issues related to the justification for war, the progress of the war, and the outcome of the war. Also, Japan is not the part of the coalition forces and distanced itself from this conflict, although the Koizumi Government has supported the US government positions. Thus, the US and Japanese news media show quite different patterns of sympathy and antipathy toward the US-led forces in the Iraq War (Findings 2) and that the Japanese media's approach to the Iraq War is more focused on diplomatic relations, especially in the United Nations, and less military-strategy centered than the US media (Findings 3). Finally, the reporting of civilian casualties in Iraq show significant differences in the US and Japanese media because there is a more sympathetic view of Iraq and the Arabs in the Japanese media (Findings 4).

V. Conclusion

This comparative study of prewar reporting suggests that in time of crisis, the New York Times and the Asahi provided different "realities" even though they are reporting the same events. The main finding is that the contents of the two media are quite different both qualitatively and quantitatively, especially on UN weapons inspections.

Also, it is interesting that the two leading liberal media show completely different reaction toward their respective governments. Compared with the Asahi, the NYT is less critical toward the US policies of Iraq. Critics often suggest that the absence of critical reporting in the American media allowed the Bush Administration to dominate the foreign policy agenda (e.g. Schechter, 2003). During the run-up period, the US continued to fight the

"war against terror. Although the alleged links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime were not proven, there was a consensus in the United States that the link is plausible. Many critics suggested that media reporting in the US implicitly catered to this predominant consensus that appeared to take the links for granted.

Although the Japanese government officially supported US policies of Iraq, the Asahi is very negative toward both the Koizumi and Bush Administrations. The Asahi basically maintains its assertion that there must be a way not to initiate a military conflict. The frame of the Asahi may reflect the liberal ideology of the paper. In general, the Asahi keeps its distance from the American media such as the NYT. Arguably, the consistent use of liberal commentators and perspectives from other countries and international organizations helps the Asahi maintain probably more diversified views.

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イラク戦争開戦直前期における 日米両国のメディアの内容分析

前 嶋 和 弘

本研究は、日米の比較政治コミュニケーションのケーススタディーであり、イラク戦争の開戦直前期（2002年10月1日から2003年3月19日）の約6カ月間について、日米双方の代表的なメディアである『朝日新聞』と『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』のイラク情勢や開戦の可能性に関する記事の内容分析を行うものである。具体的には、両紙掲載の記事のうち、イラク戦争を扱った、あるいは関連した記事の全て（『朝日新聞』990記事、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』1242記事）について、量的な内容分析を行った上で、イラク情勢をめぐる両国のニュース報道の内容が、特定の筋書きを持っていることに着眼し、質的な内容分析を行い、その相違点を包括的に分析した。

内容分析の結果、次の5点において、両紙の違いが明確となった。5点とは、（1）アメリカのイラク政策、（2）戦争に対する切迫感、（3）イラク情勢における国連の役割、（4）一般市民の犠牲とその可能性、（5）ニュース・ソース——である。この中でも両紙の間で、大きく差が出たのが、「アメリカのイラク政策」についてであり、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の場合、『朝日新聞』に比べて、「アメリカのイラク政策」の記述が量的にも多かったほか、質的に分析しても、政府の対応や、今後の戦略や戦争への準備など、内容も非常に具体的であり、国連核査察に対するフセイン政権の対応の遅れのため、「戦争やむなし」という論調や記述が目立っていた。これに対し、『朝日新聞』の場合は戦争を急ぐブッシュ政権に批判的な論調や記述が主流だった。また、戦争に対する切迫感は、『朝日新聞』が「戦争は選択肢の一つでしかない」といった内容の論調や記述が目立つ一方で、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の場合、戦争は「“あるかないか”ではなく、“いつか”」といった切迫した視点からの報道が主であった。

さらに、イラク情勢における国連の役割については、『朝日新聞』の方が国連に言及した記事が占める割合が多かったほか、国連の役割自身についても肯定的であり、「世界の運命を決める」国連の有効性が強調されていた。これに対して、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の場合、国連の役割に懐疑的で

あり、イラク査察は効果的でなく、フセイン政権の大量破壊兵器開発をとめるのに十分でないことを指摘した記事が目立っていた。また、一般市民の犠牲とその可能性についても、両紙の扱いは異なっており、『朝日新聞』より、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の方が記述そのものの割合が少なかった。ニュース・ソースについても、大きく異なっており、『朝日新聞』は、公式の記者会見をソースにした報道が中心だったが、『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』の場合、政権担当者、議会関係者などからの直接取材が多かった。

このように、両紙の「メディア・フレーム」は大きく異なっており、同じイラク情勢を取り扱っていても、記事上では大きく異なった内容が報じられていた。