

# The Social Construction of "Evil": Comparative Content Analysis between the U.S. and Japanese Media during the Iraq War.

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## Introduction

Based on the content analysis of both American and Japanese leading news papers' editorials over the war in Iraq, this paper explores the different account of the notion of "evilness" the newspapers implicitly and explicitly depict. Special focus will be on the fact that the notion of "evil" is socially constructed by the different historical and cultural backgrounds between the Western (America) and Eastern (Japan) world.

Specifically, this paper has five sections: First, this paper extensively explains the basic ideas of the theory of social construction and its applications to the studies of political communications. Second, the difficulties to research different cultures are examined. This section refers to the debate over positivism in understanding different cultures. Third, as an example of the difficulties in understanding different cultures, the different notion of "evil" is demonstrated by C. Fred Alford's comparative study between the Western world and South Korea. Fourth, results of a qualitative content analysis of editorials printed by both American (*the New York Times*) and Japanese (*the Asahi*) major newspapers over the Iraq War are presented. Editorials are regarded as the best place to look at the qualitative similarities and differences of the two papers because editorial represents the newspaper's official positions on issues. The main arguments of this section are that both leading papers' editorials framed a different notion of "evil" in the War and that different implications over the word "evil" in the two media are socially constructed. Finally, this paper concludes with a discussion of the possibility of future research on comparison of the papers in different cultures.

## **I. The Theory of Social Construction**

Social construction theory suggests that what we see as "real" is the result of human interaction. Through such interaction, we create certain artifacts, objectify them, internalize them and then take these products for granted. These institutionalized artifacts become "realities," which is the result of "construction" by participants in a particular society. Since the publication of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), the term "social construction" has been in the mainstream of the studies of social sciences, including studies in political communication.

### **A. Stages and Types of Social Constructions**

According to Berger and Luckmann, there are three stages in the social construction of reality. The first stage is *externalization*, in which we create artifacts through social interaction. In the second stage, *objectivation* occurs when the artifacts appear to take on a reality of their own and become independent of those who created them. Finally, *internalization* is the stage in which we learn such "a reality" about the artifacts through some form of socialization.

Language is a quintessential example of artifact constructed by the participants in a society. In any given society, people create languages through social interaction both in verbal and non-verbal manners. Languages become independent of creators when people notice them and start to use them. Further, we internalize languages by agreeing to follow certain conventions, such as grammars and correct usage. It is interesting that language is also a strong vehicle of socialization to all aspects of "realities" because language continuously provides us with "necessary objectifications" and posits "the order" in our everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 22). Just as pervasive and obvious as language, money is also an obvious example of a social construction because people use money as if it has the constructed value and agree to follow certain rules in its use.

In social construction theory, it should be noted that there are two different "facts." While the actual conditions and situations are "brute facts," social institutions or cultural artifacts are called "institutional facts." Cultural and societal factors are one of the major producers of "institutional facts." The two kinds of "facts" are not always identical because "brute facts" are

not ontologically dependent on "institutional facts," and vice versa.

The distinction between the two kinds of "facts" is important in understanding less obvious examples of social constructions. These include class, race, religion, and sexuality. The concepts of these may be constructed by society in such a way that certain types of perception (including a stereotyped view) are reinforced, although the "brute facts" belonging to the concepts are different or unchanged. Some of these institutionalized concepts are believed to be arbitrary and even made-up by certain social interactions, regardless of the "brute facts."

These less obvious concepts are more important objects of analyses in social sciences. One of the most typical topics of research relating to social construction deals with sexuality. Scholars argue that categories of sex and gender are socially constructed in institutional contexts. It has become fairly common to separate biological sex from gender, claiming that there is no inherent connection between the two. Scholars, such as Judith Lorber, talks that the rules by which biological women navigate the world are products in a given society; thus, there are no "brute facts" that compels women to wear dresses, have long hair, be nurturing toward children, cook, or clean (Lorber 2006). Anne Fausto-Sterling also observes that the categories of male and female are not always sufficient to describe the variety of sexes. According to Fausto-Sterling, individuals born intersexual may constitute as much as four percent of the population. These infants are eventually become either "normal" males or females by absorbing and internalizing social conventions (Fausto-Sterling 2006).

Race and ethnicity is another typical example in researching social construction. Omi and Winant argues that race consciousness is largely a modern phenomenon. According to these scholars, what is important about the construction of race categories in the United States is that race is a sociohistorical concept, in which racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context. Furthermore, they suggest that racial and ethnic categories are significant in that they are constructed in a hierarchy from "superior" to "inferior" (Omi and Winant 2006). In a similar vein, Karen Brodtkin illustrates that Jewish people, as well as some other immigrants to the United States in the late 19th century, were once seen as belonging to an "inferior

race." Economic and educational advancements, as well as others, played an integral role in constructing the immigrants as "inferior" and in later "reconstructing" them as white and no longer an inferior ethnic group (Brodkin 2006).

Social construction theory may suggest that there are multiple "realities" even for the same "brute fact." In other words, "realities" are different in the eyes of each beholder. These multiple "realities" is considered "the Rashomon effect," named after a famous movie *Rashomon* (1950). It is the phenomenon by which observers of an event produce a statement bearing substantial differences, although they experienced the same incident.

## **B. Social Constructions of Hate Crime**

In order to give further explanation of social construction theory, I will introduce my study on hate crime legislations in the United States during the late 1990s (Maeshima 2000). I examined the legislation process of two federal hate crime related legislations: the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 and the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994. The former is the law to gather data on hate crimes in 50 states. It requires the Justice Department to acquire data on crimes which "manifest prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity" from law enforcement agencies across the country and to publish an annual summary of the findings (28 United State Code 534). The latter attempts to strengthen penalties when criminals commit federal crimes whose motives were based on hate. These were separate legislations, but later this measure was enacted into a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The provision directed the United States Sentencing Commission to provide a sentencing enhancement of "not less than 3 offense levels for offenses that the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt are hate crimes" (Public Law 103-222). The two hate crime legislations intended to curb frictions among different racial, ethnic, and religious groups. In a diverse, multi-cultural society, such as the United States, these laws have the potential to act as deterrents against schisms and as a catalyst that will bind people together. The two legislations were enacted; however, I argue that the two Acts are so ineffective that they have been only symbolic rules to fight against hate crimes. Part of the reasons for the complications in actual

enforcement of the laws is that there is a grave issue yet to be solved before the bills became laws. The issue in question is related to social constructed images and ideas of a hate crime.

Hate crime is by its nature socially constructed, but among socially constructed concepts, "hate" is not easy to conceptualize. This is because "hate" is rooted in each individuals' feelings and the definition of hatred varies. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish a real hate crime, caused by a pure hatred toward a particular group, and just law-breaking conduct toward a particular person who happens to be part of the group. Thus, prosecutors and law enforcement officers encountered difficulties in prosecuting hate crime because of the need to identify hate and assess the perpetrator's bias or prejudice.

Another complication is that the nuance of "hate" is quite different in each region of the United States. Interestingly, after the image of "a hate crime" is widely recognized in a particular area, the offense itself becomes more numerous in that area. This is because both the citizens and the police became well aware of the existence of the nature of hate crime. However, it is noted that the areas where the image is not socially established, the same crime is not the object of a prosecution or an arrest, or even an investigation. Thus, the data collected by the mandate of the Statistics Act are far from accurate. Several states introduced various types of state hate crime acts, but it is common that the details about what constitutes a hate crime are quite different.

Comparison between the states in the Northeast and states in so-called Deep South gives an explanation for different treatments of hate crime. Northeastern states have a larger number of reported hate crimes. The numbers of reported hate crimes in 1997 in the states of Massachusetts, Maryland were 497 and 335, respectively. These states are generally considered to be sensitive toward race and ethnic relations among their residents. By contrast, the states in the Deep South, such as Mississippi or Alabama, reported significantly small numbers of reported hate crime incidents during the same year. In the same year, Alabama and Mississippi also reported zero hate crimes, and Louisiana reported only five. Although racial and ethnic tension is much alleviated from what once existed, these Southern states used to be a pinnacle of racial inequality. For instance,

Alabama is the state about which Martin Luther King lamented strong racial prejudice in his famous speech in Washington in 1963. In these Southern States, "hate crime" is not sufficiently socially recognized (Maeshima 2000, Federal Bureau of Investigation 1998).

### **C. Social Construction Theory and Political Communication**

Social construction theory is often adopted in the field of political communication. Especially, since the 1990s, the social construction of reality has attracted growing attention in political communication research (see Tuchman 1978, Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson 1992). These studies have focused upon news content as a form through which the mass media view and perceive an event or issue, and how they construe "realities" in their production process. Using content analysis as a method, these studies seek to analyze the concepts, categories, and ideologies in news selections and reporting. They suggest that "newsworthiness" is not a quality inherent in events, but a negotiated social process between the sources and newsmakers, greatly constrained by the distribution of the newsmakers in time and space. Gaye Tuchman argues that "news is perpetually defining and redefining, constituting and reconstituting social phenomena" (1978, 184).

Murry Edelman (1988) claims that media news accounts are not simply factual presentations. Rather, such accounts represent an interpretation of the day's political facts, which are themselves interpretations of issues, events, situations, and problems as generated by interest groups, government officials, and elected representatives among others. According to Edelman, the mass media constructs and reconstructs the world of public affairs, and political news is arranged as a series of dramatic symbols, such as "enemies," "leaders," and "problems." Edelman argues that media accounts evoke a spectacle that is a construction by political actors, including media organizations themselves. Political roles, statuses and ideologies are given certain meanings in the media spectacle.

News selection and treatment are not free from values and ideology. Analyzing the interaction between media professionals and their "sources" in political and state institutions is crucial for understanding the production of media content. Thus, one of the typical ways of analyzing the media's social

construction of reality is to investigate the sources used in the reporting. Gamson suggests that the media are likely to selectively omit several important components of the news, and that the absence of certain facts can reveal a story line that favors certain interests (such as industrial interests and bureaucratic process) which the media are representing (Gamson 1989, 158). Sources are chosen based on "suitability" (Gans 1979). Tuchman (1978) traces the organization of the "news-net" through which reporters find occurrences to be transformed into stories; defines the "web of facticity" that accepts information from legitimated institutions as "facts," but rejects the facticity of information from other sources. Cohen et al. further point out that social reality is a media product of the interaction between objective reality and a society's own pragmatic and social needs (Cohen, Adoni, and Bantz 1990).

By choosing sources, news media simultaneously conduct processes of "framing." As defined by Entman (1993), framing essentially involves salience and selection. Noting the power of frames on the public, Entman wrote, "Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions"(55). Framing is one of the crucial aspects of the media's social construction of reality; therefore, the construction and impact of media frames have become major areas of research in political communication. Gitlin (1980) introduced the concept of framing to mass communication studies in his classic examination of how an American television network trivialized a major student political movement during the 1960s. News coverage of any social movement can use a variety of framing strategies. The news can describe the scope of the social problem, critique alternative proposals for coping with the problem, or detail the tactical moves of activists and officials. Iyengar (1991) observed that television news frames issues in either an episodic or thematic fashion. Episodic news focuses on concrete events and personalities. Thematic news puts events in a larger social and economic context. According to Iyenger, television has a need for simplicity and brevity, and thus, episodic framing dominates news coverage.

Another aspect of framing is making "story lines." Through framing, political elites, including the media, attempt to simplify a complex issue into relatively simple storyline and shape citizens' political preferences. These

storylines are in nature reflected by the elites' definition about what a public policy issue is about. According to Gamson and Modigliani, through this story line making, political elites attempt to direct attention toward a particular aspect of a public policy issue and, consequently, away from others. They suggest that the fact that the same basic story line is repeated in so many different media is likely to lead many people to accept it as a common point of reference (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 1992).

The concept of social construction is also widely used not only in political communication, but also in public policy analysis. Some studies deal with social constructions as notion to categorize political participants, created by social or political strata. In Schneider and Ingram's own definition, "social construction" is certain shared characteristics that connote a discrete social group of positive or negative connotations (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335). Their definition of social construction focuses on the government's policy attention, not exclusively on media. According to Schneider and Ingram, this definition of social construction gives rise to a four-cell classification scheme for social groups. Powerful, positively constructed groups are "advantaged"; powerful, negatively constructed groups are "contenders"; weak but positively constructed groups are called "dependents"; and the unfortunate weak and negatively constructed groups are labeled as "deviants." Advantaged populations have considerable political power and are positively constructed as meritorious group. They include scientists, business, veterans, and the elderly. "Contenders" are groups that are powerful, but are constructed as vocal and in some cases greedy strata of society, such as Wall Street investors, savings and loan executives, big labor, and gay and lesbian activists. "Dependents" lack political power and are constructed as good people. Typical examples are children, mentally and physically disabled or sick people. "Deviants" are in the worst situation, as they lack political power and are negatively constructed as undeserving, dangerous, and generally "bad people." Examples of deviants are criminals, drug dealers, flag-burners, and child-abusers.

This classification then explains how policies allocate burdens and benefits among target populations. "Advantaged" groups, for example, will receive high benefits, low burdens, and control over agendas and



policymaking. Deviants, on the other hand, get low benefits and high burdens. This four-cell classification gives rise to potentially testable hypotheses about policy outcomes (Schneider and Ingram 1993).

## **II. Difficulties in Understanding Different Cultures: Peter Winch's Arguments of Cultural Sensitivities**

Since societal factors are one of the major agents of social construction, cross-cultural comparison may face a very fundamental, but difficult question about understanding different cultures. The question is centered upon language and its representation because one cannot be sure if an equivalent concept or a word exists in the language being compared. Even if he finds a similar concept or word in the language, there is a possibility that the word may have quite a different cultural background and its meaning is not always the same. Thus, it is imperative to be sensitive in understanding the meaning of a word in comparison as denoted by the specific culture. A scholar who attempts to compare cultural artifacts needs to have a sensitivity to the culture of the societies in which the languages are used.

### **A. Peter Winch's Criticism of Positivism**

Cultural sensitivity toward a different society has been a matter of heated discussion. One of the most significant arguments about cultural sensitivity is the Peter Winch's criticism of positivism in the social sciences. Winch claims that social science fails to successfully understand human actions as long as it employs the same kind of justification as the natural sciences, such as setting certain criteria to judge human actions in other cultures. Winch, whose analysis is based on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, argues that we should not see a society through our own pre-set standards of judgment. Thus, Winch suggests that the best way to avoid misunderstanding a society which seems quite different from our own is to try to approach the society from the inside, and that we have to establish rational criteria that are specific to that culture.

In his seminal article "Understanding a Primitive Society" (1964), Winch explains the above-mentioned argument by exemplifying E. E. Evans-Pritchard's anthropological study of the mystical practices of the Azande, a "primitive" people living in central Africa (Evans-Pritchard 1937,1976). The

centerpiece of Winch's argument is Evans-Pritchard's judgment of the Azande's "alien" practices, such as the influence of witchcraft, the efficacy of magic medicine, and the role of oracles in the Azande society.

Scientific methods of investigation, such as the Evans-Pritchard study, have shown conclusively that there are no relations of cause and effect in the beliefs and practices of the Azande. Thus, Evans-Pritchard critically pronounced that their belief in the existence of witches is false, magical medicine is illusionary, and oracles are ineffective. Winch claims, however, that this conclusion was not fair to the Azande society, and that Evans-Pritchard is crucially wrong. This is because of the difference in the concept of "objective reality" between Western and the Azande societies. Winch elucidates:

Evans-Pritchard, although he emphasizes that a member of scientific culture has a different conception of reality from that of a Zande believer in magic, wants to go beyond merely registering this fact and making the scientific conception agrees with what reality actually is like, whereas the magical conception does not. (308)

Winch challenges the philosophy of the social sciences. According to Winch, Evans-Pritchard applies a criterion which is appropriate to the evaluation of technology in relation to social practices, but which do not play a technological role in the Azande society. Winch further finds Evans-Pritchard's preoccupation with a positivistic approach is the flaw in the methodology of the social sciences. Winch elucidates the dogma of the social sciences:

We may ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with reality and test this by observation and experiment. Given the experimental methods, and the established use of the theoretical terms entering into the hypothesis, then the question whether it holds or not is settled by reference to something independent of what I, or anybody else, care to think. But the general nature of the data revealed by the experiment can only be specified in terms of criteria built into the methods of experiment employed and these, in turn, make sense only to someone who is conversant with the kind of

scientific activity within which they are employed . . . What Evans-Pritchard wants to be able to say is that the criteria applied in scientific experimentation constitute a true link between our ideas and an independent reality, whereas those characteristic of other systems of thought---in particular, magical methods of thought—do not. (309)

Winch holds that the reason why a Western scholar, such as Evans-Pritchard, often regards magic as an irrelevant form of technology is that the scholar attributes his explanations to his own culture. According to Winch, Western culture is "a culture whose conception of reality is deeply affected by the achievements and methods of the sciences" (307).

In order to remove the stereotypes derived from our own culture, Winch suggests that "the conception of 'reality' must be applicable outside the context of scientific reasoning. Although concept of witchcraft, oracle, and magic in Western culture is a perversion of other orthodox concepts both in religious and scientific sense, it has, according to Winch, "reality" in Zande culture. Winch notes, "A Zande would be utterly lost and bewildered without his oracle. The mainstay of his life would be lacking. It is rather as if an engineer, in our society, were asked to build a bridge without mathematical calculation, or a military commander to mount an extensive coordinated attack without the use of clocks. (311)

Comparing them with Western society, Winch suggests a different role for "primitive" practices in Zande life. Winch implies that Evans-Pritchard may underestimate the religious depth of traditional mystical practices of the Azande. Winch sees Zande magic, like Christian prayer, expresses certain attitudes about the contingencies of life:

I do not say that Zande magical rites are at all like Christian prayers of supplication in the positive attitude to contingencies which they express. What I do suggest is that they are alike in that they do, or may, express an attitude to contingencies, rather than an attempt to control these. (321)

Winch's answer to the intelligibility of religion and of cross-cultural

understanding is investing sui generis 'language-game' of the society. This is because language in a society has its own methods and standards in its usage. In *The Idea of Social Science* (1958) Winch stresses the importance of language. In Winch's view, language is not only a tool of analysis, but also the indispensable access to reality. This is because "in discussing language we are in fact discussing what counts as belongs to the world. Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language we use" (11-12).

Winch's assertions are not completely free from problem. Arguably, cultural relativism may hinder his view. However, it is true that cultural sensitivity toward different society is a very basic attitude for a scholar of any cross-culture-related field.

### **B. Debates between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, and Others**

It is important to note that Winch's work stands as a landmark over the last four decades in the argument with regard to positivism and especially to its "scientific methods." One of the most famous and most heated discussions over positivism is observed between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. In his major work, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, originally published in 1959 (2002), Popper suggests that the principle of induction cannot be purely logical "like a tautology or an analytic statement" because inductive inferences are only "probable inferences" (28, 29). Thus, Popper argues that the true aim of the scientist should not be to prove hypotheses true, but to prove them false. Through the work of falsification, false understandings can be systematically rejected. Falsification also requires a hypothesis. According to Popper, knowledge grows not through simple observation, but through the imaginative formulation of a hypothesis and its test. Popper believes that falsification emerges as the point of demarcation between science and non-science, and that only empirical tests can play a role in the development of knowledge (57-73). In this way, Popper holds that scientific advancement is achieved. His doctrine of falsifiability is important to a post-positivist view of scientific activity, and it has a particularly noticeable influence on research methods in the social sciences, including political science.

Although Popper rejects simple inductivism in science, his assertion is

based on traditional views of positivism (or so-called post-positivism) in comparison with Kuhn (Fuller 2004; Ruddock, 26-36, 2001). Like other positivists, Popper believes that since truth exists "out there," and that it is available upon which to base to a genuine scientific theory, if approached correctly. In his major work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962, 1996), Kuhn suggests, however, scientific advancement does not occur the way Popper explains it, but results from a series of paradigm shifts. Kuhn argues that scientific advancement is not evolutionary, but rather is a "series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions," and in those revolutions "one conceptual world view is replaced by another" (10). Instead of seeing the history of science as a natural progression towards ultimate truth, Kuhn regards it as a long series of conflicts between different and competing ways to process data and explain results. The transformations resulting from the conflicts are gradual as old beliefs are replaced by the new paradigms creating "a new gestalt" (112).

With regard to the theory of a paradigm, there is a parallel between Winch and Kuhn. There is a clear resemblance in Winch and Kuhn's views about societal impact on the formation of a concept. Winch illustrates with the conceptual development of the "theory of disease." Winch argues this development:

involved the adoption of new ways of doing things by people involved, in one way or another, in medical practice. An account of the way in which social relations in the medical profession had been influenced by this new concept would include an account of what that concept was. Conversely, the concept itself is unintelligible apart from its relations to medical practice (Winch 1958, 122).

Just as Popper's idea of falsifiability has wielded a huge influence on research methods, Winch-Kuhn's notion of scientific development affected many scholars about how to conduct research. Many scholars, both in the social sciences and humanities, have followed strikingly similar approaches to that of Winch. Especially in the field of cultural anthropology, many studies are conducted from viewpoints similar to Winch's. One example is a series of studies by Clifford Geertz. Geertz's famous observation of a

Balinese cock fight is based on the investigation of the 'language-game' of the society that Winch emphasizes the importance of (Geertz 1972). In order to properly understand the cultural importance of the Balinese cockfights, it was essential for Geertz to become more of a part of the Balinese culture. According to Geertz, the only way to understand the meanings of various expressive forms is to observe them in a particular context. Using this methodology, Geertz finds the cockfights' vital meanings for the Balinese. For example, cockfights are well attended events by men only, which is significant to their notion of masculinity. Also, bets are taken on these events, although the money isn't all that is at stake. Further, Geertz discovers Balinese conceptions of the State and divinity based on the cockfight. Geertz concludes that the fight is a central symbolical structure of the Balinese society.

In the field of social science, several research methodologies, mainly qualitative methodologies, follows the notion of a scientific development advocated by Winch and Kuhn's. One of those most typical research methods that emphasizes Winch-Kuhn's notion of scientific development is participant observation. Participant observation is a popular and widely used research method and requires close involvement with a given group of individuals and observation of their activities in their natural environment. An observer should immerse his/herself in the culture of a given society as fully as possible over extended periods of time. Participant observation originated in cultural anthropology, but because of its recognized validity, social scientists, including political scientists, use the same method. An example of participant observation in contemporary political science is a seminal study of Richard Fenno. Fenno has studied members of Congress by following them around on their visits to their states and districts, and trying to blend in with the members' environments (Fenno 1978). Fenno's description of his work as "soaking and poking" (Fenno 1978, 249) has become synonymous with this style of research. Many political scientists, such as James Glaser, who undertook participant observations have utilized some of the lessons from Fenno's projects, such as the know-hows of establishing and developing rapport, and keeping intellectual distance from the object observed (Fenno 1978, 1990; Glaser 1996).

### **III. Difficulty in Investigating the Meaning of the Word "Evil" between Cultures**

As discussed in the previous section, the debate over positivism is deeply rooted in the difficulties of understanding different cultures. The discussion requires a scholar of any cross-culture related fields to be sensitive toward different cultures. Cross-culture investigation by comparing the same word or concept especially poses another complexity. This is because the same word may sometimes have different connotations in different cultures, even if its denotative meaning is similar. In order to further explore the sensitivity of cultures, this section exemplifies different accounts of the notion of "evil" in the Western world and in East Asia.

The word "evil" has a very strong connotation in the Western world. This is because Western culture is rooted in Christianity. In Western culture, practicing Christianity and leading a daily life based on the Christian ideal is considered "good." Typical Christian rules, such as Ten Commandments and avoiding the Seven Sins teach their believers to be a "good" being under God. In Christianity, the antonym of the word "good." is, of course, "evil." An aberrant act from "goodness" is believed to be an "evil" deed. Thus, "evil" is a detestable concept, and an "evil" deed is an act of aberration which must be avoided in the Western World (Arellano 2004).

These concepts about "evil" may be difficult to translate into Asian cultures. Compared with Western ideas, the East Asian concept of its "evilness" may not have a strong religious connotation. This is partly because East Asian countries have a tradition of polytheism or henotheism. Polytheistic or henotheistic religious traditions are widely spread throughout the regions of East Asia. Buddhism and Confucianism, the two most widely accepted religious traditions in East Asia, are considered very inclusive in their beliefs, as opposed to the "mutually-exclusive, either-or values" of monotheistic tradition (Kunihiro 2006). In addition to the two religions, other local polytheistic religious traditions, such as Shintonism in Japan and Shamanism in Korea, have provided historically agnostic cultural background. Unlike monotheistic religions, such as Christianity and Islam, polytheism acknowledges multiple gods and divinities, and "the good" acts are relative. In polytheistic cultures, the dichotomy "good-versus-evil" acts tend to be blurred because people's belief system is more likely to accept the

relativity of "evilness"(Hawkins 2003; Ooms 1988; Bellah 1957).

C. Fred Alford (1999) examines Korean society where there is no word that equates to the Western term "evil." Alford questions whether there is a society without "evil" and how such a society sees human nature. He searched for answers in Korea by interviewing two-hundred and fifty Koreans, including thirteen Korean Americans. The interviewees consisted of a wide range of citizens, chosen from an economic, political, religious, and demographic cross-section of Korea. The questions in the interviews are about their views on evilness, the self, and globalization. He also asked college students to write an essay about the same questions. Alford talked -- and sometimes ate and drank as well—with interviewees and actually found that the nonexistence of evil in Korea. The interviews reveals that his initial hypothesis that "evil would be divided into different areas of life governed by different religious principles" (89) was rejected.

Alford argues that Koreans regard evil not as a moral category but as an intellectual one. Alford explains his views: "I do not imagine that I have explained the Korean view of evil. Rather, I have mapped its absence. This map is fundamentally a Western overlay, showing where East does not match West. It is all I could do, all any Westerner can do, I believe. The trick is to know it" ( 7 ). Alford also discovers the Koreans' sentiment that evil results from the creation of dualisms, oppositions between people and ideas, and that the content of the Korean view of evil is "the fear of absolute otherness and difference" (12). Interestingly, this fear is not the fear of the other as the Western views it, but the Korean version of the fear is "the fear of becoming other to oneself"(12). Alford also finds in the mind of Koreans that the real evil is "the evil that cannot be spoken: unrelatedness, the dread of absolute alienation and unconnectedness, pure loneliness, absolute difference" (11).

Alford concludes that evil cannot exist in Korea because "Korean have created a universe in which there is no place for it . . . the Korean *ak* and *choe* are not really about evil at all" (89). The absence of evil is explained by Koreans' sentiment toward themselves and social relationship with other. Alford maintains that in Korean such values as *chong* (affection), *han* (suffering), and *kibum* (mood) are held together in the tightly woven social networks; thus; social relationship is itself "the standpoint of judgement"(94)



for Koreans. At the same time, Koreans have a concept of *uri* (we) which shows loose boundaries between the self and the group-self. Similar to this point is that what Koreans fear most is isolation from the group-self and social values associated with it. Alford argues that Koreans are very anxious about domination by individuals because it is against their social relationships.

Since the interviews were conducted immediately before and after the economic collapse of December 1997, Alford also found an intriguing fact that related to Koreans' account for evil. Alford discovered that Koreans' responses to globalization matched Westerners' views about evil. Alford argues that globalization threatens to create a world "in which Koreans no longer recognize themselves, in which Koreans are other to themselves"(12). Globalization (*segyehawa*) to Koreans is evil because it is for Koreans a great failure of the economy which also isolates individuals from close social relationships. Globalization represents "the dangers of atomization, isolation, fragmentation and loss, turning Koreans into strangers in their own world"(145). Thus, Alford suggests that globalization is "what Korean most fears, becoming alien to themselves, living in a world of pure otherness" (155).

The Japanese society may share very similar views on "evilness" with South Koreans, and the Japanese also have different concept on evilness from the Western nations. This is because of the cultural resemblance between Korea and Japan. Just like Korea, eclectic mixtures of religion are co-existing in Japan as well. For Japanese people, good-versus-evil dichotomy is sometimes blurred, compared with Western nations whose dominant culture root is in Christianity, and the word "evil" is quite a relative and nuanced term.

#### **IV. The Different Notion of "evil" in the War in Iraq between the US and Japanese Media: The Content Analysis of Editorials**

As an illustration of the different accounts of "evilness," this section compares American (*the New York Times*) and Japanese (*the Asahi*) major print media organizations' editorials during the period of actual combat of the Iraq War (from March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003). I have already published two related works, both of which employed content analysis

methodology of the two print media. One is about content analysis in the two papers during the run-up period of the war (from October 1, 2002 to March 19, 2003). This study found that the two allies' media have quite distinctive treatments of the war, especially their rationalization of the cause of the Iraq War, the role and the power of the United Nations in relation to the war, and the degree of intensity in the coverage of civilian casualties and anti-war movements, among other things (Maeshima 2006a). The other specifically focuses on the news written by "embedded journalists" during the actual battle (from March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003). This research concluded that in the two papers' "embedded journalists" produced articles that are sometimes similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and in their focus on daily activities in the field. Nonetheless, there are significant disparities in their formats and degree of sympathy they have with the coalition forces (Maeshima 2006b). Both previous studies suggest that even the same or similar phenomenon is sometimes quite differently portrayed by the two media. Based on these findings, I will argue that different notions of evil in the two papers' editorials account for the core of their difference in their coverage of the War.

### **A. Research Design**

This section qualitatively compares typical editorials of *the Asahi* and *the New York Times*, written in almost similar periods of the Iraq War. The editorials to compare are: ( 1 ) immediately after the launch of the War (March 20); ( 2 ) ten days after the War was initiated (March 31); ( 3 ) The fall of Baghdad (April 9); ( 3 ) President Bush's "mission accomplished" speech (April 30). Editorials are the most visible outlets of the political position of a newspaper. These editorials express fundamental differences of the two leading newspapers. Research question is whether the papers' characterizations on "evil" may differ, even when both papers reported the same or similar news. In other words, differences may be found in the way they construct "realities" on evilness over the Iraq War. After presenting major finding of the comparisons (subsection B), detailed illustrations will be explained by using both papers' editorials immediately after the launch of the War (subsection C) and on the fall of Baghdad (Subsection D).

## B. Major Findings

The two print media portrayed the War in Iraq quite differently. The biggest difference in the results of the content analysis is that the two leading liberal papers have constructed different "evildoers."

### 1) *The Asahi*

Contrary to *the New York Times*, *the Asahi* depicts America as the bigger "evil" who initiated an ungrounded war. Also, *the Asahi* indicates that the United Nations is the organization to halt the "American invasion." Unlike *the New York Times*, French actions over the Iraq War are, in *the Asahi*, noble. In the paper, America's evilness is more conspicuous than that of Hussein

In every editorial, the *Asahi* firmly suggests that the US action to start the war is wrong and that US attacks into Iraq are immoral acts of invasions. It is noticeable that *Asahi's* responses to the war in Iraq matched Westerners' views about "evil" in Christian terminology. It seems that the *Asahi* believes that any actions to start a war are the worst and most sinful action of humankind. This is because many innocent lives are lost and the life of their families are destroyed in any given war. Also, President Bush's "us vs. them" and "good vs. evil" dualism are parts of *Asahi's* criticism because anyone—even those who with a decent cause---start an actual battle is "evil" for the editors in *the Asahi*. *The Asahi* seems to define that evil as the US side which committed a sin for the peace of the world by initiating the War.

### 2) *The New York Times*

*The New York Times* portrays Saddam Hussein as the personification of "evil" In the newspaper, Hussein has supported terrorists' activities and tormented Iraqi citizens who want to have freedom. Indeed, Hussein is the America's archenemy in the stories of *the New York Times*. The paper repeatedly indicates that the United Nations is a powerless organization which cannot stop the Hussein's plot. French opposition is one of the main reasons why the US was not able to obtain a full support from the United nations. Thus, a series of French actions are also portrayed rather negatively in *the New York Times*.

While *the New York Times* treated the War as a hasty invasion without UN mandate, the paper's editorials sometimes shed light on the aspects of

"liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein's despotic regime." Also, the paper well explained the importance of ousting Hussein for the sake of American national security and peace in the Middle East countries. Furthermore, *the NYT* devoted a relatively large portion of its editorials on the daily activities of the coalition forces, consisting mostly of US and UK forces.

Along with their strategies and actions, their daily lives are fully depicted. These articles include anything from mundane chores, such as the way to dig a foxhole and to eat and sleep in the desert, to their relationship with colleagues, and to the families they left at home. Also, there are numbers of editorials which referred to the interactions with local residents which the coalition forces "liberated" These articles provide an image that indicates that the "common people like us" extend their effort to save the innocent people who were "suffering from the tyrant regime."

By contrast with *Asahi*, it appears that *the NYT* regards the threat to international security is "evil" in Christian sense. Thus, Saddam Hussein, the despotic leader who might have weapons of mass destructions is an "evildoer." Although both papers' notion of evil gravitate around the possibility to endanger a number of people, the *Asahi* focuses more on the action of killing and *the NYT* pays more attention on the prevention of massive killing.

### **C. The Editorials of Both Papers on the Beginning of the Iraq War**

As an illustration of the above-mentioned findings, the editorials of both papers on immediately after the launch of the War need to be thoroughly explored.

#### *1 ) The Asahi*

Regarding the Iraq War, *the Asahi* has been unequivocally anti-war. In the editorial immediately after the beginning of the Iraq War, *the Asahi* declared a firm opposition to the War. This is because the paper seems to believe that the military action intervention was preventable. The editorial on March 22, 2003 is titled "End the conflict swiftly: The 21st Century's War Must not be Religious War." This article suggests: "Even when it was still possible to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction short of resort to military intervention, the Bush administration chose to use force, despite widespread

opposition to war. We do not support this war." *The Asahi* disapproves of the US policies choice to use force because "it was still possible to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction short of resort to military intervention."

*The Asahi's* major concern that any conflict must be avoid seems to have originated from the fact that damages of Iraqi civilians are huge because "in any conflict, those who suffer most are those who are ruled, not those who rule" and "many people, civilian and military, are being killed or wounded and property is being destroyed." The editorial suggests that minimizing civilian casualties is a practical solution even after the War was initiated. The editorial asserts that: "considering the realities [of the fact that the War was started even if the paper has been strongly opposed], the next challenge is to determine what course would be best for the people of Iraq and the world. Above all, the challenge is to bring the war to a swift conclusion with minimal casualties." According to the article, the best practical measure after the launch of the War is a swift conclusion with minimal casualties.

For the welfare of Iraqi citizens, the paper hopes US and British military strategies should be citizen-friendly. According to *the Asahi*, the attacks must be "narrowly focused upon military targets and facilities related to weapons of mass destruction" and must not use hugely destructive new weapons, as was the case "during NATO air strikes upon Yugoslavia or in the U.S.-initiated assault upon terrorist targets in Afghanistan." At the same time, *the Asahi* demands that Saddam Hussein not to sacrifice the people of Iraq for his own honor and especially claims that employing chemical and biological weapons never be allowed.

*The Asahi* further notes the importance of offering assistance to the people of Iraq. The paper asserts:

The United Nations anticipates 10 million people will be short of food within six weeks. The United States is said to be committed to continue to provide food and medical supplies. We hope arrangements will be made as soon as possible to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq from the international community. The flood of refugees can be expected to be significant. The United States and Britain should do their best to secure the safety of the refugees, in cooperation with Iraq's neighbors.

*The Asahi's* basic assertion has been that the United States should dictate the Iraq issues even when the War had already been started. This editorial put an emphasis on the role of the United Nations' rebuilding efforts in postwar Iraq. Since it is not easy to maintain peace in postwar Iraq because of ethnic and religious complications, the editorial predicts that it is "next to impossible" for the United States to stabilize Iraq without the assistance of the United Nations and other countries. The article elucidates:

In the United Nations Security Council meeting just before the start of the war, which the American and British foreign ministers chose not to attend, their counterparts in France, Germany and other countries opposed to the war expressed their readiness to provide cooperation and humanitarian assistance in Iraq after the war, even though they criticized Washington for the war itself. We hope those nations and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will pursue diplomacy toward ending the war quickly.

The editorial juxtaposes televised statement of President George W. Bush with that of Saddam Hussein, noting the somewhat detached way that the two leaders "presented their causes in televised statements." The tone of the article is, however, more disapproving of the US situation: "In the 48-hour countdown to the start of hostilities, American television networks broadcast the unfolding pre-war developments. The war being waged by the United States is evolving as if it were some sort of game."

An interesting finding is that *the Asahi* suggests the root cause of the Iraq War. It seems to believe that possibly a major reason for the conflict can be attributed to the difference in religions and cultures. In this editorial, the *Asahi* analyzes that Christian "good and evil" dichotomy that lies at the basis of the Bush's decision on Iraq:

The phrase "Arab world" also turns up in many references in Saddam Hussein's address. He said the Arab world is a source of dignity, and added, "Long live the Arab world." And, he said, since Bush has made this American-initiated war a conflict directed at the whole Arab and Islamic world, the Arab people would rise up in a jihad (holy war). Since the conflict began, the Arab and Islamic nations have come to regard the role of

American and British troops as a revival of the Crusades of the Middle Ages. Some Islamic leaders even go so far as to call for a "jihad against the infidels." The concepts of good and evil that President George W. Bush ascribes to are said to be heavily influenced by fundamentalist Christianity. The fact that Bush often quotes the Bible in his addresses only adds to the credibility of that observation. Bush is also the president who likened war in Afghanistan to the Crusades. Officials of his administration do not hesitate to speak of democratization in the nations of the Middle East as if to ignore the cultures and traditions of the Arab world.

Christians and Islam discord is a familiar concept for political scientists. *The Asahi* argues the prime mover of the conflict is "The Clash of Civilizations." This notion is proposed by Samuel Huntington during 1990s. The editorial continues:

Samuel Huntington, the noted U.S. political scientist, noted that with the end of the Cold War, there would be a clash of civilizations of Christianity, Islam and other religions. The Middle East is already afflicted with the unresolved problems of the fate of the Palestinians in a dispute that stems largely from religious discord. Depending upon how the war develops, there is a danger it will aggravate the clash of civilizations.

Thus, the conclusion of the editorial is that the Iraq War must not be shaped as a religious conflict caused by the abhorrence of other religions: *The Asahi* quotes a part of George H. W. Bush's memoir and implies that the current president's father had endeavored not to frame the First Gulf War as a religious confrontation between the West and the Islam world and further argues:

Pope John Paul II has pleaded for peaceful resolution of the Iraqi problem, and other Christian leaders have expressed similar concerns of a clash of civilizations. In his address announcing the start of war against Iraq, Bush said he would pay "due respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice." We hope he will clearly remember what he has said. War at the beginning of the 21st century must not become

a religious conflict.

## 2 ) *The New York Times*

On the beginning of War, *the NYT* carried two editorials consecutively for two days. One seems to be written simultaneously with the launch of the conflict ("The War Begins," March 20, 2003), while the other is about the initial progress of the War ("How to Watch the War," March 21, 2003). The editorials of *the New York Times* clearly present a different perspective of the Iraq War. While *the Asahi* stresses the importance of the lives of Iraqi civilians and exclude the concerns of those in the United States and British forces, *the NYT* attempts to care for both. From the context, *the NYT* put emphasis on the safety of the American military.

No one who knows the American military doubts that it will do its job to the best of its ability and with an unswerving consciousness of the balance between opportunity and risk. The lives wagered in this operation belong to young Americans and to Iraqis of all ages. Perhaps no military has ever known as well as this one how important it is to have a care for those lives.

While the *Asahi* does not touch upon strategies or new developments in the military, *the NYT* points out the goal of the mission and the latest advancements in military technology, especially as a comparison with the first Gulf War:

Many Americans remember the first gulf war all too vividly, and the temptation will be to read this war against the backdrop of that one. The terrain is the same, but everything else has changed. A military that, even a dozen years ago, still found itself shuttling paper battle orders back and forth is now electronically linked and coordinated in ways that would have seemed unimaginable then. There is no strategic exit in the offing, as there was when the coalition forces stopped well short of Baghdad in 1991. Now it is Saddam or nothing.

Whereas *the Asahi* presents a clear opposition to the War, *the NYT* position is somewhat ambivalent. This is partly because *the NYT* has



asserted that the war should be undertaken only with broad international support. Also, its ambivalence is reflected of huge supportive sentiments for the military action since the scars of the 911 terrorists' attacks were still vivid for many Americans.

Our job here is not as transcendently clear as the soldiers' job. Now that the first strikes have begun, even those who vehemently opposed this war will find themselves in the strange position of hoping for just what the president they have opposed is himself hoping for: a quick, conclusive resolution fought as bloodlessly as possible. People who have supported Mr. Bush all along may feel tempted to try to silence those who voice dissent. . . . If things go as well as we hope, even those who sharply disagree with the logic behind this war are likely to end up feeling reassured, almost against their will, by the successful projection of American power. Whether they felt the idea of war in Iraq was a bad one from the beginning, or -- like us -- they felt it should be undertaken only with broad international support, the yearning to go back to a time when we felt in control of our own destiny still runs strong. Of all the reasons for this mission, the unspoken one, deepest and most hopeless, is to erase Sept. 11 from our hearts.

The conclusion of *the NYT's* editorial is vague, compared with *the Asahi*. *The NYT* suggests only that debate over what comes next is imperative because "we have scarcely begun to talk about how it should be accomplished." The paper claims:

As a nation we have scarcely begun to talk about how it should be accomplished. Even as we sit here at home, worrying about the outcome of the fighting, we must start to debate what comes next. That public discussion has to start soon, even tomorrow. But for now, all our other thoughts have come to rest. We simply hope for the welfare of those men and women -- sons and daughters -- who will be flinging themselves into the Iraqi desert.

The editorial juxtaposes televised statement of President George W. Bush with that of Saddam Hussein, noting the somewhat detached way that the two leaders "presented their causes in televised statements." The tone of the

article is, however, very cynical. It states "in the 48-hour countdown to the start of hostilities, American television networks broadcast the unfolding pre-war developments. The war being waged by the United States is evolving as if it were some sort of game."

In the next editorial after the initial attack, *the NYT's* position on the War becomes more noticeable. The editorial is very supportive for the American actions in Iraq ("How to Watch the War," March 21, 2003). The tone of the editorial is almost jingoistic as the results of the initial attack were described as "breathtaking":

The war's opening barrage was a bold effort to kill Saddam Hussein and other top leaders of his regime even before a large-scale invasion had started. Reacting quickly to intelligence that Iraqi leaders were holed up in a bunker, American ships fired nearly 40 cruise missiles from the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and stealth fighters dropped bombs on the compound shortly after. It was a breathtaking example of coordination and precision.

Whereas the *Asahi's* major concern is the lives of Iraqi citizens, the editorial of *the NYT* pays attention to the degree of success of the attacks. The editorial argues that success of the initial attack of the Iraq War remains uncertain. This is because of the fact that the effectiveness of high-tech weapons was exaggerated by the media during the 1991 gulf war---even that war was a real victory for America. Thus, the editorial proposes four benchmarks that can be used to measure the progress of the ongoing military campaign. These proposals are: command of the air, protection the oil fields, speed, and most importantly, creating welcoming attitude among Iraqi citizens. These pieces of advice are stated to help obtain "the ultimate prize": the control of Baghdad. The article predicates that "wise handling of the end game will be the final measure of allied success."

The four benchmarks proposed in the editorial are, indeed, constructed through the eyes of military commanders. First, the editorial claims the "command of the air" is important because "allied planes will need to sweep Iraq's feeble air force from the skies and suppress its air defenses, a more difficult task." Second, the article urges that ground forces must protect the oil fields quickly because Iraq has already set oil wells on fire before they

fall into American hands. It further notes: " failure to do so will risk the loss of an asset important for rebuilding the country." The third proposal is quick actions, aiming to contain the conflict inside Iraq. The editorial claims that speed is very critical in preventing Iraqi missile attacks on Israel. Once Israel retaliates, the article suggests, the anger of the Muslim world will be gravely incited and tough diplomacy will be needed by the US. Also, the article notes that quick action will keep Kurds and Turks from clashing into a battle in Northern Iraq. Thus, the article proposes that "airborne troops will need to establish a presence quickly before the north disintegrates into chaos." Fourth and most crucial the editorial notes, is the creation of a welcoming attitude to Iraqi citizens. To *Asahi's* editors, the fourth benchmark *the NYT's* editorial offers sounds very controversial. *The NYT's* editorial provides only a neat public relations idea for the US forces among Iraqi citizens, whereas the most important concern of the *Asahi's* editorial is protecting Iraqi citizens. Furthermore, *the NYT* suggests having a good "package" to control the images of the forces in order to justify the War. *The NYT's* editorial states:

Nothing could make this invasion look better around the world than evidence that it is welcomed by the Iraqis themselves. So mass defections by Iraqi soldiers and crowds of joyous civilians hailing the invaders as liberators would be very good signs. If that is going to happen, it will most likely be in the south, where morale is said to be low among Iraqi troops and where Shiite Muslims have long been in conflict with the Hussein regime. By the same token, nothing could damage the justification for this war more than extensive "collateral damage," harming great numbers of civilians. Precision-guided weapons will be relied on to keep the damage limited to military targets, and military leaders have pledged to avoid civilian casualties. If they fail, it will be a black mark on the invasion.

#### **D. The Editorials of Both Papers on the Fall of Baghdad**

The fall of Baghdad was a symbolic incident: the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein at a square in central Baghdad. This incident was a most crucial media spectacle as well as it marking the genuine overturning of the long-standing ruler in Iraq.

1) *The Asahi*

*The Asahi's* portrayal of this incident is very cynical, to say the least. The editorial on the US-led forces' control of Baghdad is filled with pessimistic perspectives of the US actions in Iraq ("After the War in Iraq 'Might Makes Right' not the Road to Real Progress," April 21, 2003). As this title indicates, the editorial seeks for fundamental change in US policies in Iraq.

The editorial first cites the statement of President Bush made soon after a statue of Saddam Hussein was removed from the streets in central Baghdad. *The Asahi* regards the statement "Human beings yearn for freedom. That is a God-given doctrine" as self-congratulatory remarks without understanding the ramifications of the War. Then, the article refers to the fact that some of the American media is jubilant about the fact that the entire nation of Iraq came under the control of U.S. and British forces with relatively little loss of the lives of coalition forces. Also, the article finds that several Japanese media outlets have started to rationalize the US actions in Iraq. The editorial, however, warns that the situation is not as simple as those media organizations both in the US and Japan think it is. The article continues:

Many media in America praised the victory, with neo-conservative magazines making bullish declarations that this victory marks the return of a "strong America," and that the war against terrorist states had gotten off to an "auspicious start." The tone of Japanese newspapers and other media also tended to argue that the legitimacy of the decision by the United States and Britain to go to war was proved. Reasons cited in that argument included the easy victory of the coalition forces, as well as upbeat reports on the liberation of the Iraq people from Saddam's brutal regime. . . . We question, however, whether the situation is really so simple. It would be risky to simply forget matters of greater importance. Above all else, this refers to the great sacrifices that have accompanied the victory on the battlefield.

The rationale of the warning is, among other things, the damage of Iraqi civilians. The article notes on the suffering of Iraqi people, including Iraqi soldiers:

The number of Iraqi civilian lives lost in the air strikes is estimated in the thousands. The ranks of the injured amount to several times that number, with many suffering because they cannot obtain adequate medical treatment for their wounds. The number of Iraqi soldiers killed in the conflict is yet unknown, but must certainly defy any comparison with the moderate losses on the U.S. and British side.

The editorial also concerns difficulties in reconstructing postwar Iraq by noting that "the task of rebuilding a nation comprised of a complex mix of different religious sects and tribes will not be an easy one. Signs of confusion are already appearing in the move to establish a working transitional governing body."

The paper points out that the United Nations was "a big loser in this game, having been summarily snubbed by the United States and Britain," and also the organization seems destined for further complications because U.S. leaders are reluctant to involve the United Nations in the rule of postwar Iraq, while France and Germany still support the role of the UN in its reconstruction.

*The Asahi's* standpoint remains anti-US. The editorial suggests the troubled relationships between the US and Europe have deepened the European distrust of America in a wide range of policies such as a ban on nuclear weapons testing and solutions for global warming. According to the paper, one growing problem is the increasing power of neo-conservatives in the United States who may "exacerbate the split between America and Europe and bolster the belief in the irrelevance of the United Nations." The editorial contrasts the "lawful UN" and the "bellicose" US, and provides a prediction that the anti-US sentiments of other countries renders a troublesome scenario. It explains: what will come about if the U.N.-centered "control by law" is vanquished by "rule by force"? One dark scenario is rampant support for the logic of opposing the United States with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and any other means available, leading to a chaotic and danger-packed world."

To avoid the problem, *the Asahi's* editorial proposes that one of the major tasks that America is facing is reassurance of the United Nations' authorities, and that the international community also has to seek a way to lure America

back under the reign of the United Nations. This is because "there is no organization that plays a greater role in working for peaceful solutions to disputes than the United Nations." The article, however, considers the effort "the tremendous challenge of how to truly prevent the spread of terrorism."

The editorial implies a possibility of reforming the UN's anti-terrorism functions, but its emphasis is on the effort of America and its allies because "regardless of how great a superpower it has become, it [America] cannot function alone in the global community." Thus, the article argues that action must be taken by U.S. allies to firmly convince America to debate in the arenas of the United Nations. The paper brings up an anecdote of *Gulliver's Travels* written by Jonathan Swift.

Taking stock of the current power balance, we wonder if the Bush administration does not indeed view the United Nations as being intent on stealing away its freedoms-much like the Lilliputians used ropes to tie down mighty Gulliver. In fact, that metaphor is currently finding considerable sympathy and acceptance around the world. . . . If Gulliver were to wrest free of the ropes and go on a rampage, the giant itself would also find it difficult to live and prosper in the midst of the chaotic mayhem most likely to follow.

( 2 ) *The New York Times*

As opposed to the pessimistic *Asahi's* editorial over the US invasion into Iraq, *the New York Times'* editorial on the fall of Baghdad ("The Fall of Baghdad," April 10, 2003) is jubilant about the demise of the Hussein regime. The editorial states that "the murderous reign of Saddam Hussein effectively ended yesterday as downtown Baghdad slipped from the grip of the Iraqi regime and citizens streamed into the streets to celebrate the sudden disintegration of Mr. Hussein's 24-year dictatorship." The article, indeed, celebrates the ousting of Saddam Hussein. The paper claims that "the scene in central Baghdad, where jubilant Iraqis and American marines collaborated in toppling a huge statue of Mr. Hussein, signaled that a complete American military victory in Iraq may be achieved within a matter of days, not months." The editorial continues with a hilarious tone:

The swiftness of the American advance and the relatively low number of American and British casualties reflect a well-designed battle plan and the effective use of air power to weaken and demoralize Iraq's ground forces. The numbers of Iraqi casualties, military and civilian, remain to be determined, but they are likely to be considerable.

The editorial acknowledges the criticism on the US actions into Iraq ("Opinion about This War has been Divided from the Beginning."). The paper's focus is, nonetheless, different. The editorial suggests that it is important to focus on rebuilding Iraq after the dictator is gone. The tone of the description may sound hypocritical, compared with that of *the Asahi*. The paper notes, "Now that Mr. Hussein's rule has ended, there is unity among good-hearted people everywhere, a hope that what comes next for the Iraqi people will be a better, freer and saner life than the one they had before." Also, the importance of peacekeeping is emphasized because "cities where the sudden collapse of the government has left a power vacuum that invites lawlessness. In the absence of civil government, there is an ominous potential for strife and bloodshed in a nation ripe with ethnic divisions and hatreds." While the editorial warns of the necessity to stabilize the country, it positively summarizes the event by noting that "the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime can be the opening chapter in a positive and historic transformation of Iraq."

## **V. Conclusion and Future Research**

This paper has argued that the problem of comparison between different cultures derives from two types of "facts": one is a "brute fact," and the other is "institutionalized fact." "Institutionalized fact." is socially constructed by the traditions and cultures inherited in the given society. Because of the latter, analyzing different cultures needs special attention.

After discussed theories of social constructions and the debate over positivism, the latter half of this paper empirically examined the concept of "evil" in two different studies. First, the research by Alford suggests that the notion of "evil" in South Korea is quite different from that in Western nations. Second, my own research on editorials of Japanese and American print media finds that different implications over the word "evil" exists in

the two media.

Since the scope of my research is limited, further comprehensive qualitative and possible quantitative analyses are needed to understand the notion of evil during the War in Iraq. For example, another term may broaden the horizons of this comparison of the media contents across the Pacific. One of these terms may be the word "invasion." There were some discussions over this term in Japanese media. Although the Japanese equivalent word of "invasion" is "shinryaku" (entering forcibly); the Japanese word has a stronger connotation than the English equivalent. While *the Asahi* use the term "shinryaku" from the beginning of the War, some print media, such as *the Sankei* or *the Yomiuri*, disliked the strong connotation and employed the word "shinkou," advancing troops, instead. From the beginning of the War, *the NYT* use the word "invasion." It seems that there is no big debate in the United States over the word "invasion" and its connotation.

Also, the roles of public opinion must be investigated. It may be logical to surmise that differences of public opinion between the United States and Japan may be one of the significant causes for the different portraits of the War by the two media. This is because any media organization is supposed to mirror the opinion of strata of its society. Since both *the Asahi* and *the NYT* are one of the largest newspapers in each country, the articles in both papers reflect public in Japan and the United States, respectively. Further, their government's positions over the Iraq issues affect public opinion and the contents of the media both in the US and Japan. Different press-politics relationship is an especially important aspect to investigate.

Finally, these further examinations may enlarge the scope of understanding cultures. Comparison of the papers in different cultures may make us sensitive to differences with other cultures. Comparing texts written in different languages needs special attention, which eventually deepens our perception toward a different society.

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## 「悪」の社会構築 ——イラク戦争についての日米のメディアの比較分析

前 嶋 和 弘

本論文では、イラク戦争（2003年3月20日から同年5月1日）についての日本（『朝日新聞』）とアメリカ（『ニューヨークタイムズ』）の両紙の社説の質的な内容分析を行なっている。分析の結果、日米で戦争における「悪」の概念が大きく異なっている事実が明らかになった。具体的には、『ニューヨークタイムズ』においては、大量破壊兵器製造の計画を進め、イラク市民を抑圧する“独裁者”フセインが「悪」として描かれているのに対し、『朝日新聞』においては、多くの一般市民の犠牲者を生む戦争そのものが「悪」として描かれている。『朝日新聞』においても、フセインが好ましい政治的指導者ではないことが指摘されているが、国連による話し合いの機会を重視せず、戦争行為を仕掛けるアメリカ側の方が「悪」とあるという描かれ方となっている。

本論文では、異なった概念が構築される事実を理論付けるために、まず、社会構築の理論や概念を説明する。さらに、社会構築の概念の違いがしばしば大きな問題となる異文化研究の困難さについて、「未開社会」をめぐるピーター・ウインチの議論や、実証主義をめぐるカール・ポPPERとトーマス・クーンの論争を紹介する。さらに、C・フレッド・アルフォードの研究に基づき、キリスト教的な概念に基づく「悪」が、東アジア圏である韓国では存在しないだけでなく、韓国では、グローバリズムこそ欧米における「悪」に近い概念となっている、という論点を検証する。最後に、イラク戦争についての日米メディアの比較をまとめ、「悪」が異なった概念として構築されているほか、国連や市民の犠牲者についての報道の違いなども分析している。